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ESTATE TAX-ESTATE OF D'AMBROSIO V. COMMISSIONER
REINTERPRETATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 2036(A) NETS ESTATE $330,000 IN
TAX SAVINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
As between life's two certainties, death and taxes, taxes prevail be-
cause when death is no longer an option, there are still taxes to pay. Since
1916, when an individual has died, his or her estate has been subject to
federal taxes.1 Although the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") provides a
tax credit that effectively exempts $600,000 in assets from estate tax, tax-
payers with assets in excess of $600,000 are confronted with progressive
rates-from thirty-seven percent for estates valued over $600,000 to fifty-
five percent for estates valued over $3 million.2 Thus, wealthy taxpayers
1. See I.R.C. § 2033 (1994) (stating that estate includes all property that dece-
dent owned at death). For estate tax purposes, the decedent's estate also includes,
inter alia, certain gifts made within three years of death, property that the dece-
dent transferred before his or her death but, in which he or she retained a life
estate, transfers taking effect at death, revocable transfers, annuities, employee
benefits, joint tenancy property, life insurance policies and property that the dece-
dent transferred for partial consideration. See id. §§ 2035-2043 (providing estate
tax rules for each property type).
The Revenue Act of 1916 established the estate tax. Revenue Act of 1916, ch.
463, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777-78 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Estate tax is a tax on the transfer of property to
succeeding generations and is imposed upon the property value of the decedent's
estate. See Mark R. Siegel, Retained Possession and Enjoyment: Searching Out the Reality
for Residential Transfers, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 81, 82 n.9 (1994) (defining estate tax and
contrasting it with inheritance tax); see alsoJESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.JoHAN-
SON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 991 (5th ed. 1995) (stating that Congress initially
enacted estate tax because of increasing military expenditures from World War I).
The 1916 estate tax was not repealed after World War I because the tax had popu-
list support as a means to level "swollen fortunes" from the "robber baron" era. See
id. at 991-92 (noting that estate tax also was not repealed because it was source of
federal revenue).
2. I.R.C. § 2010(a) (providing for tax credit). The Tax Reform Act of 1976
("1976 Tax Act") unified estate and gift taxes. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); see also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 995 (noting that tax
credit is equivalent to exemption). In the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
("1981 Tax Act"), the unified credit increased to $192,800, which is equivalent to
an exemption of $600,000 in estate assets from estate taxes. Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 299 (current version at 26 U.S.C.
§ 2010(a)); seeTaxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 501(a), 111 Stat.
778 (modifying section 2010 by gradually increasing exemption from $625,000 in
1998 to $1 million in 2006); DUKEMINIER &JOI-ANSON, supra note 1, at 996 (noting
that tax rates begin at 37% for estates worth $600,000 or more and that amounts
over $3 million are subject to 55% rate). Estates over $3 million, although taxed at
(1949)
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have a strong incentive to mitigate this tax through estate planning.3 One
technique that estate planners customarily use to reduce the estate tax
burden is the sale of a remainder interest. 4 A remainder interest is the
interest remaining in a property upon the termination of the immediately
preceding estate, such as a life estate.
5
For example, if a client indicates that he or she would like to give
their niece $500,000 in ABC Pharmaceuticals stock tax free, the estate
planner could advise the client to sell a remainder interest in the stock to
his or her niece, while retaining a life estate for himself or herself.6 If the
client agrees, the planner would consult the Code's actuarial tables to de-
termine that the client's retained life estate would be worth $341,950 and
the remainder interest would be worth $158,050.7 The client's niece
a higher rate, still receive the $192,800 tax credit. See id. (stating that Code applies
tax credit for all estates regardless of worth and then computes relevant estate tax).
For a table showing the unified transfer tax rate graduated schedule, see infra note
30.
3. See generally DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 993-94 (stating that
1976 Tax Act and Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-517, 100 Stat. 2085
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), reduced several "loopholes" that
helped to avoid estate tax).
4. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 216-17, 266-74
(3d ed. 1993) (discussing remainder interests).
5. See BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1293 (6th ed. 1990). A life estate is a an estate
with a duration limited to the life of the person holding it or the life of some other
person. See id. at 924.
A fee simple interest is a property interest that is free of any limitations. See id.
at 615-16. A taxpayer, owning a fee simple interest, can split this interest by selling
a remainder interest in the property while retaining a life estate. See DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 4, at 266-67. Thus, the property owner who sold the remainder
interest is then known as a life tenant. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra, at 924
(defining life tenant as one whose legal right to remain in possession of property is
measured by his or her or another's life). The owner of the remainder interest,
known as the remainderperson, has the vested right to a fee simple interest in the
property upon the death of the life tenant. See id. at 1293 (defining "remainder-
man"); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 267 (noting that remainder
interests may be contingent). Upon the life tenant's death, the life estate termi-
nates and is not part of the decedent's estate. See I.R.C. § 2033 (stating that gross
estate includes all property that decedent owned at death). But see DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 994 (discussing how Congress ended tax exemption for
life estates in 1986 legislation). If the original property owner does not want to sell
a remainder interest in the property, he or she may alternatively opt to retain a
term interest, such as an annuity interest, or an income interest. See Martha W.
Jordan, Sales of Remainder Interests: Reconciling Gradow v. United States and Section
2702, 14 VA. TAx REv. 671, 671 n.1 (1995) (discussing split property interests).
6. See Thomas W. Abendroth, Sale of Remainder Interest: Will Any Court Get It
Right?, TRUSTS & EST., Sept. 1996, at 49, 50 (using similar hypothetical to illustrate
sale-of-remainder-interest technique). For a discussion of the sale-of-remainder-
interest technique, see infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
7. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d) (6) (as amended in 1990) (providing actua-
rial tables to determine present value of remainder interest based on life expec-
tancy of life tenant). The tables provide the ratios needed to compute the present
value of the remainder interest based upon the transferor's actuarial life expec-
tancy. See id. (setting guidelines for calculation of remainder interest). If the in-
1950 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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would then pay her uncle or aunt the fair market value of $158,050 for the
remainder interest. 8
Thus, under this technique, by receiving the fair market value as con-
sideration, the client would be able to exclude the value of the stock from
his or her estate.9 Additionally, upon the client's death, the niece would
own a fee simple interest in the stock.10 Thus, if ten years after the trans-
action, the client dies and the ABC pharmaceuticals stock has appreciated
to $2 million, the planner would not have to include the ABC
Pharmaceuticals in the client's stock because the client sold his or her
terest to be valued is to take effect after the death of an individual, the present
value of the remainder interest is computed by multiplying the value of the prop-
erty by the appropriate remainder interest actuarial factor from Table S of the
regulations. See id. § 20.2031-7(d) (2) (ii) (explaining how to compute value); id.
§ 20.2031-7(d) (6) (providing that "Table S" is used to determine present value of
remainder interest); see also I.R.C. § 7520 (providing applicable interest rate for
use in Table S); Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-3(b) (as amended in 1990) (listing certain
limitations on use of actuarial tables). For example, if the planner's client is 65
years old and the § 7520 interest rate is 9.0%, the actuarial factor from Table S is
.31610. See id. § 20.2031-7(d) (6) (giving examples of how to apply table ratios); see
also I.R.C. § 1274(d) (adjusting federal midterm rate monthly to reflect changes in
market rate); id. § 7520 (setting rate for Table S at 120% of federal midterm rate,
which is determined under § 1274(d)). See generally Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT's,
GRAT's and GRUT's: Planning and Policy, 11 VA. TAX REv. 761, 773 n.22 (1992)
(discussing § 7520 and concluding that Congress set rate too high). To compute
the value of the remainder interest, the actuarial factor of .31610 is multiplied by
the value of the underlying property. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d) (2) (ii) (pro-
viding formula). Therefore, the remainder interest in the ABC Pharmaceuticals
stock is valued at $158,050, although the life estate is worth $341,950. See id. (pro-
viding actuarial factor of .31610 to help determine value of remainder interest); see
also id. § 20.2031-7(d)(5) (illustrating, in regulation's "Example 1," valuation of
remainder interest).
8. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49 (explaining sale-of-remainder-interest
technique). Because the client's niece purchased the remainder interest for ade-
quate and full consideration, the client's retained income interest in the ABC
Pharmaceuticals stock would not cause the property to be included in his or her
estate. See id. (noting that practitioners believed that if they valued property cor-
rectly and properly applied Internal Revenue Service (IRS) valuation tables, re-
mainder sale would be effective to remove underlying property value from estate).
Thus, when the client dies, his or her life estate terminates and the ABC
Pharmaceuticals stock would pass free of the estate tax to his or her niece. See id.
(explaining how taxpayer could transfer without incurring estate tax).
9. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (stating that general rule of transfer with retained life
estate is to include full value of underlying asset in decedent's estate, except when
transfer is bona fide sale made for full and adequate consideration). Thus, be-
cause the client sold the remainder interest for its fair market value, the planner
expects that the decedent's estate will not include the full value of the underlying
property. For a further discussion of § 2036(a), see infra notes 13-18, 45-50 and
accompanying text.
10. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, at 267 (explaining that remainder
interest is future interest that is capable of becoming fee simple interest at termi-
nation of life estate).
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remainder interest for its fair market value." Moreover, the niece would
have fee simple ownership of stock worth $2 million for which she had
paid just $158,050 ten years earlier.' 2
Although this technique would help to reduce an estate's tax burden,
one concern is that the courts will not uphold its validity because of the
effect of § 2036(a) of the Code, which provides that the gross estate shall
include the value of property retained as a life estate "except in [the] case
of a bona fide sale for ... adequate and full consideration."1 3 Congress
enacted § 2036(a) to prevent estates from being depleted by manipulative
11. See id. For a discussion of why the client does not need to include the
amount that the ABC stock appreciated in his or her estate, see supra notes 6-9 and
accompanying text.
12. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 50 (illustrating similar example). The
$158,050 that the niece paid for the remainder interest was calculated using the
IRS tables. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d) (6) (listing "Table S" as chart to be used
for calculating value of remainder interests). The tables assumed that the niece
will receive exactly $500,000 at her uncle's or aunt's death and that the rate of
return for a current income interest was 9.0%. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 50
(explaining reasoning behind values in actuarial tables); see also I.R.C. § 7520 (pro-
viding interest rate to determine actuarial factor). Because the ABC Pharmaceuti-
cals stock significantly appreciated over 10 years, the client's niece paid a bargain
price for the stock. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 50 (explaining potential bene-
fit of buying remainder interest). For a discussion of how estate planners used the
sale-of-remainder-interest technique to take advantage of growth assets, see infra
notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
13. I.R.C. § 2036(a). Section 2036 defines the general rule for transfers with
a retained life estate:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer (except in case of a bonafide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death -
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.
Id. (emphasis added); cf Siegel, supra note 1, at 85 (noting that personal residence
transferors do not retain possession if transferee voluntarily makes gift back to
transferor by permitting transferor to live in residence). The § 2036(a) exception
for remainder-interest transfers that are bona fide sales for "adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth" exempts property from the estate when the
remainder-interest transfer did not cause depletion of the estate and evade taxa-
tion. See Rachel Lorey, Note, Gradow v. United States: Death of Remainder Interest
Sale as an Estate Freezing Technique?, 8 VA. TAx REv. 183, 191 (1988) (noting that if
decedent receives consideration equal to value of property transferred, estate is
same size as before transaction) (citing I.R.C. § 2036(a)).
For a further discussion of the purpose of § 2036(a), see infra notes 14-18, 45-
50 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the bona fide sale excep-
tion of § 2036(a), see infra notes 47-65, 93-192 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the relationship between § 2036(a) and other Code provisions, see infra
notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
1952
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transfers of remainder interests. 14 Thus, an estate planner's primary con-
cern is what constitutes "adequate and full consideration."
15
Recent case law has illustrated that, for the purposes of § 2036(a),
"adequate and full consideration" for a remainder interest equals the full
value of the underlying property, not the remainder interest value that the
planner determined from the Code's actuarial tables. 16 Thus, in the ear-
lier example, the client's transfer failed the bona fide sale exception be-
cause the remainder interest was not sold for the full value of the stock,
$500,000.17 Therefore, the planner not only would have failed to give the
client's niece a tax-free gift, but also would have subjected an unexpected
$1,841,950 to estate tax. 18
14. See Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 312 (3d Cir.
1996) (discussing effect of§ 2036(a)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997). "Section
2036(a) effectively discourages manipulative transfers of remainder interests which
are really testamentary in character by 'pulling back' the full, fee simple value of
the transferred property into the gross estate, except where the transfer was 'a
bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration."' Id.; see Estate of Wyly v. Com-
missioner, 610 F.2d 1282, 1290 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The purpose of [§ 2036(a)] is to
prevent circumvention of federal estate tax by use of inter vivos schemes which do
not significantly alter lifetime beneficial enjoyment of property supposedly trans-
ferred by a decedent."); Henry Gottlieb, $330,000 Tax Appeal Victory, N.J. L.J., Dec.
23, 1996, at 16 (noting that § 2036(a) discourages "manipulative transfers" of testa-
mentary remainder interests).
15. For a discussion of the conflicting views about the meaning of "adequate
and full consideration" in § 2036(a), see infra notes 49-65, 93-192 and accompany-
ing text.
16. See Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 813-14 (1987) (holding that
for sale of remainder interest to meet bona fide sale exception of § 20 3 6 (a), trans-
ferors must receive adequate and fair consideration equal to fee simple value of
underlying property), aff'd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Parker v. United
States, 894 F. Supp. 445, 447 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing Gradow and concluding that
value of what decedent received must be compared to entire value of underlying
property); Pittman v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 833, 835 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (same);
Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1856, 1863 (1996) (stating
that to determine whether consideration is adequate, court must compare value
that decedent received with total value of property decedent transferred, rather
than just considering remainder interest value); Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commis-
sioner, 105 T.C. 252, 259-60 (1995) (same), rev'd, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), and
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997). But cf. Abendroth, supra note 6, at 50 (noting
that, prior to case law to the contrary, "virtually no one questioned the basic princi-
ple that an amount equal to the value of the remainder interest determined under
the IRS tables would constitute adequate and full consideration under § 2036(a)").
For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 93-192 and accompanying text.
17. See Pittman, 878 F. Supp. at 835 (determining for purposes of bona fide
sale exception under § 2036(a), "it is the value of the entire property which is mea-
sured against the consideration received"). Thus, when the planner's client sold
the remainder interest to his or her niece, the client should have received
$500,000, the value of the ABC Pharmaceuticals stock, as consideration, not the
fair market value of the remainder interest. See id.
18. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of any interest [including interests from transfers not
meeting the bona fide sale exception] therein included."); DAmbrosio, 105 T.C. at
252 (allowing amount includible in taxpayer's estate to be reduced by value of
consideration received). Thus, the client's estate will include the full fee simple
5
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Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed this issue in Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner.1 9 The Third
Circuit held that the sale of a remainder interest for its fair market value,
without testamentary motivation, constituted a sale for adequate and full
consideration. 20 Thus, in the Third Circuit, the planning technique used
by the planner in the example is still a viable option. 2 1 The decision, how-
ever, created a circuit split because the Third Circuit interpreted the bona
fide sale exception to be more inclusive than other federal circuit courts
have in previous decisions. 22 Therefore, whether a tax planner can utilize
value of the ABC Pharmaceuticals stock ($2 million) less the consideration re-
ceived from his or her niece ($158,050) for a total of $1,841,950. See I.R.C.
§ 2036(a) (requiring value of underlying property to be included in estate); see also
id. § 2043 (providing amount included in estate is fair market value of property at
time of death less consideration received).
19. 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
20. See id. at 318 (holding that remainder-interest transfer met bona fide sale
exception of § 2036(a) and excluding underlying property from decedent's es-
tate). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that it
needed to consider the issue of "whether the sale of a remainder interest for its fair
market value constitutes 'adequate and full consideration' within the meaning of
§ 2036(a)." Id. at 312. The court held that the Tax Court erred as a matter of law
by ruling that the consideration received by the taxpayer, which was the fair mar-
ket value of the remainder interest, was not adequate and full. See id. For a discus-
sion of the Third Circuit's reasoning in D'Ambrosio, see infra notes 122-92 and
accompanying text.
21. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 318 (holding that estate planning similar to
example of client's niece meets bona fide exception of § 2036(a) and is excluded
from decedent's estate for tax purposes). But cf. I.R.C. § 2702 (limiting Third Cir-
cuit's effect to nonfamily members and applying it only to transfers made after
October 8, 1990). Section 2702 treats the sale of a remainder interest in property
to a member of the seller's family as a gift, unless the purchase price paid for the
remainder interest is equal to the fee simple value of the property. See id. (provid-
ing that "[s] olely for purposes of determining ... whether a transfer of an interest
in trust to ... a member of the transferor's family is a gift ... [t]he value of any
retained interest which is not a qualified interest shall be treated as zero"). See
generally Jordan, supra note 5, at 704-16 (discussing § 2702's effect on remainder-
interest transfers). The amount of the § 2702 gift is the full value of the property
less the consideration received from the purchaser. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-4(d)
(as amended in 1992) (defining § 2702 gift). This limit, however, does not apply
to nonfamily members. See I.R.C. § 2702(e) (stating that "member of the family"
shall have meaning given such term by § 2704 (c) (2)); see also id. § 2704(c) (2)
(defining family member). Section 2704(c) (2) states that "[t]he term 'member of
the family' means, with respect to any individual-(A) such individual's spouse,
(B) any ancestor or lineal descendant of such individual or such individual's
spouse, (C) any brother or sister of the individual, and (D) any spouse of any
individual described in subparagraph (B) or (C)." Id. For a further discussion of
§ 2702, see infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
22. Compare D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 318 (holding that bona fide sale exception
includes transfers of remainder interest for consideration equal to fair market
value of remainder interest), with Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516, 519 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (holding that bona fide sale exception only includes transfers of re-
mainder interests for consideration equal to fee simple value of underlying
property).
1954
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the technique of selling a remainder interest is yet to be conclusively
settled.2
3
This Casebrief considers the Third Circuit's interpretation -of
§ 2036(a) and compares it to contrary case law. Part II traces the history
and purpose of § 2036(a), discusses the sale of remainder interests, ana-
lyzes the congressional response to taxpayer abuse of this technique and
addresses recent case law.24 Part III examines the Third Circuit's interpre-
tation that the sale of a remainder interest at fair market value meets the
bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a). 25 Part IV describes the application
of the Third Circuit's ruling on remainder interests that were transferred
prior to December 1987.26 Finally, Part IV also reconciles the Third Cir-
cuit's decision with other provisions in the Code.
2 7
23. See generally Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756 (1970) (stating that
Tax Court will decide cases on basis of law in circuit to which appeal will lie), affd,
445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Because of the Golsen rule, the Tax Court is bound
by the DAmbrosio ruling for cases within the Third Circuit. See id. For cases in
other circuits, the Tax Court is not bound by D'Ambrosio and, according to Golsen,
must follow the case law decided by the circuit in which the appeal will lie. See id.
(discussing Golsen rule). Thus, if the taxpayer lives in a circuit in which the court
has addressed this issue, the Tax Court will follow the circuit court's decision,
whether or not the Tax Court agrees. See id. If the circuit court in which the
taxpayer lives has not addressed the issue, the Tax Court can make its own decision
on the issue, even if its prior decisions addressing the issue conflict with decisions
in other circuits. See id. Prior to 1970, because of the interests of uniform interpre-
tation of the nation's tax laws, the Tax Court was not bound by circuit court deci-
sions when the same issue appeared before the Tax Court for a later decision. See
Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713, 716-17 (1957) ("[A] court of national
jurisdiction to avoid confusion should follow its own honest beliefs until the
Supreme Court decides the point."), rev'd on other grounds, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1958).
24. For a discussion of general estate tax law, see infra notes 28-32 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the sale of a remainder interest as an estate plan-
ning technique, see infra notes 33-36, 66-73 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the predecessors of § 2036(a) and § 2036(a)'s effect on estate plan-
ning, see infra notes 37-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Congress's
legislative reaction to the use of the technique for tax evasion, see infra notes 74-92
and accompanying text. For a discussion of case law that has interpreted § 2036(a)
as nullifying the use of remainder-interest transfers as estate planning devices, see
infra notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the scope of the § 2036(a) bona fide sale exception in
the Third Circuit, see infra notes 122-92 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit's interpretation of § 2036(a)
revalidates the intent of decedents who had transferred remainder interests prior
to December 1987, see infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of Code provisions that effect remainder-interest trans-
fers, see infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third
Circuit's effect on transactions governed by these other Code provisions, see infra
notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Taxation of the Estate
Estate tax is a tax levied upon the decedent's estate when the estate is
transferred to succeeding generations.28 Since 1981, estate taxes have not
been a consideration for most lower and middle income Americans be-
cause of the unified tax credit.2 9 The unified tax credit of $192,800 effec-
tively exempts $600,000 worth of assets from estate tax.30 The basic
purpose of federal estate tax is to tax both the value of property owned at
death and the value of property that the decedent gave away during his or
28. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 994 (distinguishing federal
estate taxes from state inheritance taxes). Inheritance tax is a tax that states im-
pose upon each beneficiary for the privilege of receiving a decedent's property,
whereas federal estate tax is a tax that the federal government imposes upon the
ross estate. See id. For example, under federal estate tax, if a person dies leaving
1 million to four children, the amount of estate tax is the same whether the dece-
dent had only one child or four children. See id. Under state inheritance tax,
however, there are progressive rates for each child's share and the total amount of
tax would be less for each child in the four-child family than the child without
siblings. See id. (noting that inheritance tax is calculated separately for each heir
and is not based on total estate).
Thus, to prevent taxpayers from circumventing estate taxes, Congress imposes
a gift tax on inter vivos gifts. See I.R.C. § 2501 (1994) (imposing gift tax on individ-
ual's "transfer of property by gift" during each calendar year). Because of a dispar-
ity in rates, the inter vivos gift remained an advantageous transaction until the gift
and estate taxes were unified by 1976. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
955, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); see also Theodore S. Sims, Timing Under a Unified Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U.
CHI. L. REv. 34, 34 (1984) (discussing advantageous taxation of inter vivos gifts
before 1976). Although estate and gift taxes are integrated, each method of trans-
fer has its advantages and disadvantages. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 686-87 n.74
(outlining advantages and disadvantages of inter vivos gift). For example, the
main advantage of an inter vivos gift is that "any future appreciation in the value of
the transferred property is removed from the taxpayer's tax base." Id. at 687; see
Gans, supra note 7, at 813-16 (comparing advantages of inter vivos gifts and testa-
mentary transfers).
29. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 299
(current version at 26 U.S.C. § 2010(a) (1994)) (establishing unified tax credit).
The 1981 Tax Act and the current Code provide a credit against estate tax of
$192,800. See id. (implementing tax credit); see also I.R.C. § 2010(a) (providing
unified tax credit).
30. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 1019 (discussing unified
credit against estate tax). The unified credit is equivalent to a $600,000 exemption
1956
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her lifetime. 31 Thus, to incur the least possible estate tax liability, a
wealthy taxpayer should structure a property transfer so that the transfer is
not a gift and does not cause the underlying value of the property to be in
the taxpayer's estate.
3 2
B. Purpose of the Remainder-Interest Transfer and the Policy to Limit Its
Abusive Tendencies
The objectives of the remainder-interest transfer are to allow the
seller to retain all use and benefit from the underlying property, while
removing the property from the seller's gross estate and to "permit the
from tax because an estate tax base of $600,000 produces an estate tax of $192,800.
See id. The unified transfer tax rate schedule is as follows:
(B)
Amount
subject to tax
equal to or
less than
$ 10,000
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
150,000
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
(C)
Tax on
amount in
column A
$ -
1,8003,800
8,200
13,000
18,200
23,800
38,800
70,800
155,800
248,300
345,800
448,300
555,800
780,800
1,025,800
1,290,800
(D)
Rate of tax in excess
over amount in
column A
(percent)
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
37
39
41
43
45
49
53
55
Id. at 996; see I.R.C. § 2010 (providing unified tax credit and tax rate schedule).
31. See DUKEMINIER &JoHANsON, supra note 1, at 1018 ("This is accomplished
by imposing a graduated tax rate schedule on the aggregate of the decedent's
taxable estate plus adjusted taxable gifts, against which various credits may be applied."
The Code's definition of the gross estate encompasses (1) transfers by will or intes-
tacy; (2) lifetime transfers that pass economic benefits upon the decedent's death;
and (3) certain nonprobate transfers. See id. (discussing gross estate); see also I.R.C.
§§ 2033-2044 (detailing transfers included in gross estate). For a list of assets in-
cluded in the gross estate, see supra note 1.
The taxable estate is the gross estate less estate administration expenses,
debts, funeral expenses, charities and marital deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 2053-2056
(detailing deductions from gross estate). To compute estate tax, add adjusted taxa-
ble gifts to the taxable estate. See DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 1019
(defining adjustable taxable gifts as gifts made after 1976 not otherwise includible
in gross estate). If the property were included in the gross estate under §§ 2033-
2044, it is not includible as an adjusted taxable gift because that would result in
double taxation. See id. (discussing reason for distinguishing adjustable taxable
gifts from gross estate).
32. For a discussion of the remainder-interest transfer as a possible option to
meet this objective, see infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the Third Circuit's approval of using the remainder-interest transfer to meet
this objective, see infra notes 122-92 and accompanying text.
1997]
(A)
Amount
subject to tax
more than
$ -
10,000
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
150,000
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
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buyer to obtain valuable property at a bargain price."3 3 The sale of the
remainder interest of a fee simple estate has three primary effects. First,
the transfer splits the property into a remainder interest'and a life estate
to provide the seller with either a place to live or a source of income. 34
Second, the seller receives consideration for the remainder interest, which
can be in either a lump-sum payment of cash (which the life tenant can
invest) or a lifetime annuity.35 Third, this transaction has potentially sig-
nificant tax advantages because the seller will avoid having the property's
value added to his or her gross estate. 36
33. HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, TAX PLANNING FOR FAMILY WEALTH TRANSFERS
11.09[3] [g] (3d ed. 1997) (analyzing sales of remainder interests). "In a remain-
der interest sale, the buyer pays the seller an amount equal to the actuarial value of
the right to the property when the seller dies [(the remainder interest)] and the
seller retains the full use of the property during his or her lifetime [(the life es-
tate)]." Id.
34. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 672 & n.1 (discussing split property interests).
For a discussion generally defining the life estate and remainder interest, see supra
note 5.
Property is generally comprised of two components: a "present value incre-
ment" and an "earnings increment." Jordan, supra note 5, at 692 (citing Keith E.
Morrison, The Widow's Election: The Issue of Consideration, 44 TEX. L. REv. 223, 231
(1965)). A complete transfer of property transfers both components; thus, it trans-
fers a fee simple interest. See id. (defining complete transfer of estate). A remain-
der-interest transfer, however, severs the two components; the seller retains the
earnings increment and the buyer receives the present value increment. See id.
(distinguishing fee simple sale from remainder-interest sale); see also Morrison,
supra, at 231 (explaining split property interests).
35. See generally JOHN CATHERALL & DANIEL E. FELD, ESTATE AND GIFT TAx Di-
GEST § 3.01 [1] (3d ed. 1996) (discussing grantor-retained annuity trusts). An an-
nuity, acting as a long-term payoff of the remainder interest, can provide a retiree
with a steady stream of income. See, e.g., Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner,
101 F.3d at 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting decedent transferred remainder inter-
est in stock for lifetime annuity), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
36. See Lorey, supra note 13, at 185 (detailing estate planning techniques).
The removal of an asset from the gross estate by a remainder-interest transfer has
several advantages. See id. First, the value of the estate asset is frozen because all
future appreciation has been shifted to the remainderperson. See id.; see also Jor-
dan, supra note 5, at 692 (describing remainder interest as present value increment
of fee simple interest, while life estate is merely earnings increment). Second, if
the planner has valued the remainder interest correctly and the consideration is
equal to or greater than that value, the Code excludes the property from the dece-
dent's gross estate. See Lorey, supra note 13, at 185; see also I.R.C. § 2036(a) (stating
general rule that transfers with retained life estates are to include full value of
underlying asset in decedent's estate, except when transfer was bona fide sale
made for full and adequate consideration); ZAR1TSKY, supra note 33, 11.09[3] [g]
(noting tax advantages of remainder interest sale if decedent sold remainder inter-
est for amount equal to its actuarial value); Jordan, supra note 5, at 677 (noting
that value of underlying property will not be subject to estate tax if decedent sold
remainder interest for adequate consideration) (citing I.R.C. § 2036(a)). Third,
the remainder-interest transferor enjoys increased liquidity by receiving the con-
sideration while still retaining use of the property. See Lorey, supra note 13, at 185
(describing advantages of remainder-interest transfer to seller). Last, "the life ten-
ant may be able to amortize the cost of the life estate." Id.; see Estate of Christ v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 490, 528-29 (1970) (holding that amortization of life estate
1958
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Even before Congress enacted federal estate tax in 1916, the remain-
der-interest transfer generated concern that it is a wealth transfer tailored
is part of consideration for remainder interest), affd, 480 F.2d 1971 (9th Cir.
1973). But see Gordon v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 309, 323 (1985) (determining
that taxpayer, who does not invest additional money, cannot divide nondeprecia-
ble property into two parts and claim amortization deductions on term interest).
Although the remainder-interest transfer has several significant advantages, it
also has potential disadvantages. See Lorey, supra note 13, at 185 (listing drawbacks
to remainder-interest sale). First, if the planner improperly values the remainder
interest, the consideration may be inadequate to exclude the property from the
decedent's estate. See id. (recommending that transferor overvalue remainder in-
terest in unclear cases); cf I.R.C. § 2043 (providing that value of underlying prop-
erty that § 2036(a) includes in gross estate is offset by consideration received).
Second, the success of the remainder-interest transfer depends upon the
remainderperson being able to finance its purchase. See id. (noting that if trans-
feror attempts to finance remainderperson's purchase, property will be includible
in transferor's estate). Finally, because the transferor no longer owns a fee simple
interest, the property is less marketable, reducing the transferor's flexibility to sell
or finance it. See id. (describing reduced value of transferor's property).
Two developments have caused the remainder interest sale to be a suspect
estate planning device. See ZARITSKY, supra note 33, 11.09 [3] [g] (explaining lim-
its of remainder-interest transfer as planning device). The first development be-
gan with the 1990 enactment of § 2702 of the Code in which Congress limited
interfamily-member remainder-interest sales to sales of remainder interests in the
life tenant's personal residence and of certain items of nondepreciable tangible
property. See id. (describing § 2702's effect on remainder-interest transfers); see
also I.R.C. § 2702 (applying to remainder-interest sales after October 8, 1990). For
a further discussion of the effect of § 2702 on remainder-interest sales, see infra
notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
The second development arose when recent case law began supporting the
IRS's view that remainder-interest sales are ineffective to remove the subject prop-
erty from the seller's gross estate under § 2036(a). See ZAPrTSKY, supra note 33,
11.09[3] [g] (describing cases holding that entire property must be included in
estate); see also Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 813-14 (1987) (holding that
for sale of remainder interest to meet bona fide sale exception of § 2036, trans-
feror must receive adequate and fair consideration equal to fee simple value of
underlying property), affd, 897 F.2d 516, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Other courts fol-
lowed the Gradow decision. See Parker v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 445, 447 (N.D.
Ga. 1995) (citing Gradow and concluding that value of what decedent received
must be compared to entire value of underlying property); Pittman v. United
States, 878 F. Supp. 833, 835 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (same); Estate of Magnin v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1856, 1863 (1996) (finding that, to determine whether
consideration was adequate, court must compare value that decedent received with
total value of property that decedent transferred, rather than just remainder-inter-
est value). But see D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 312, 318 (holding that sale of remainder-
interest for fair market value meets bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a) and,
therefore, excludes entire value of underlying property from estate).
For a further discussion of the case law finding remainder-interest sales an
ineffective way to remove the subject property from the seller's gross estate, see
infra notes 51-65, 93-121 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
Third Circuit decision in D'Ambrosio, see infra notes 122-92 and accompanying text.
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to evade taxes. 37 In the Revenue Act of 1916,38 Congress sought to im-
pose an estate tax on lifetime transfers if the parties intended the transfer
take effect "in possession or enjoyment" at the tranferor's death.3 9 Thus,
the early Code utilized a substance over form principle to subject property
to estate tax when the decedent enjoyed or possessed the property until
death, but had previously parted with legal title.40 The Supreme Court,
however, in May v. Heiner,41 refused to extend the possession and enjoy-
ment clause of the Revenue Act of 1916 to retained life estates. 42 Both
37. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 82-85 (discussing early congressional interest in
imposing estate tax on remainder-interest transfers). Even before Congress cre-
ated federal tax in 1916, state law required courts to consider the impact of inheri-
tance taxes upon transfers with reserved life estates. See In re Keeney's Estate, 87
N.E. 428, 429 (N.Y. 1909) ("[A] n ingenious mind may devise other means of avoid-
ing an inheritance tax, but the one commonly used is a transfer with reservation of
a life estate."), affd sub nom. Keeney v. Comptroller, 222 U.S. 525 (1912). An in-
heritance tax is a tax imposed upon individual beneficiaries for the privilege of
receiving property from a decedent. See DUKEMINIER &JOHANSONi, supra note 1, at
994-95 (comparing inheritance tax with estate tax). In contrast, estate tax is a tax
upon the transfer of property based on the value of property included in the dece-
dent's estate. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 83 n.9 (comparing inheritance tax with
estate tax).
38. Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C.).
39. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 83 (noting that Revenue Act of 1916 resulted
from judicial suspicion of remainder-interest transfers). The Revenue Act of 1916
provided, in pertinent part:
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has created a trust, in
contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair considera-
tion in money or money's worth.
§ 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777-78.
40. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 83 (stating that postponed "possession or enjoy-
ment" clause in Revenue Act of 1916 is derived from "well-entrenched substance
over form principle"). It is a "well-settled" tax principle that the substance of a
transaction controls over its form. See id. at 101 n.173 (discussing substance versus
form of transaction). In 1921, the Supreme Court stated: "We recognize the im-
portance of regarding matters of substance and disregarding forms in applying the
provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income tax laws enacted thereunder."
United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921). For example, in Shearer v. Com-
missioner, 17 T.C. 304 (1951), the Tax Court focused upon the substance rather
than the form of the decedent's transaction. Id. at 307-08. The decedent in Shearer
created a corporation by transferring two farms in exchange for shares of corpo-
rate stock. See id. at 305. Over the next few years, the decedent gave almost 80% of
the stock as gifts to his children. See id. He then decided to dissolve the corpora-
tion. See id. at 306. In the dissolution, the decedent received a life estate in the
farms, while his children received the remainder interests. See id. The court, ig-
nored the form of the transaction and included the full value of the farms in the
decedent's estate. See id. at 307-08.
41. 281 U.S. 238 (1930), overruled by Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335
U.S. 632 (1949). For the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Church, see infra
notes 43, 165-66 and accompanying text.
42. May, 281 U.S. at 247. The May Court concluded that, because a formal
legal transfer of title had taken place prior to the death of the decedent, it was not
1960 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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houses of Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's decision by amending
the Revenue Act in 1931 and effectively superseding May.4 3 The amended
statute was the predecessor to § 2036(a), which was enacted in 1954. 4 4
Section 2036(a) and its predecessors were enacted to prevent tax eva-
sion through the depletion of the transferor's estate.45 The general rule
of § 2036(a) is that the gross estate of the decedent includes all transfers
subject to estate taxes. Id. at 243. In May, the decedent retained a contigent life
estate. Id. (explaining that decedent's life estate was contingent upon outliving
her husband). In 1931, the Supreme Court extended the May holding to a dece-
dent's reservation of a primary life estate. See, e.g., McCormick v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 784, 784 (1931) (per curiam) (extending May to primary life estate and
holding that Congress has authority to impose laws with respect to remainder-in-
terest transfers prospectively); Morsman v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 783, 783-84
(1931) (per curiam) (same); Commissioner v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782,
783 (1931) (per curiam) (same).
The Revenue Act of 1916's possession and enjoyment clause apparently dates
back to the Pennsylvania inheritance tax law in 1826. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 83
n.19 (tracing origins of "possession and enjoyment" clause). For a history of the
clause, see Gertrude C. K Leighton, Note, Origin of the Phrase, "Intended to Take
Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at or After ... Death" (Section 811(c), Internal Revenue
Code), 56 YALE L.J. 176, 176-79 (1946).
43. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 84 (discussing 1931 and 1932 amendments to
the Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9). The joint resolution
amended the statute to provide as follows:
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,
including a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or
any period not ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or the income from, the property or (2) the right to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom;
except in case of bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth.
§ 302(c), 44 Stat. 9, 70. The following year, Congress amended the statute to in-
clude the phrase "the right to the income" in place of "the income." See Siegel,
supra note 1, at 84 (noting that Congress changed statute to include transfers in
which transferor retained "the fight to income").
In 1949, the Supreme Court formally overruled its May decision. See Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. at 637. In Church, the Supreme Court accepted:
the interpretation of the "possession or enjoyment" section under which
an estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except by a bona fide
transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and
without possible reservations, parts with all of his title and all of his pos-
session and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property.
After such a transfer has been made, the settlor must be left with no
present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that
title, and no right to possess or to enjoy the property then or thereafter.
Id. at 645. For a further discussion of Church, see infra notes 165-66 and accompa-
nying text.
44. See Lorey, supra note 13, at 189 (noting also that Congress has amended
§ 2036(a) three times since its 1954 enactment); see also I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1994).
For a listing of the predecessors to § 2036(a) and the changes that Congress made
to these statutes, see Lorey, supra note 13, at 188-91 nn.33-41.
45. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 83-85 (discussing early legislative motivation to
limit testamentary remainder-interest transfers); see also Gottlieb, supra note 14, at
13
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in which the transferor retains a life estate.4 6 Section 2036(a) excludes
bona fide transfers made for full and adequate consideration. 4 7 If a trans-
fer of property with a retained life estate does not meet the bona fide sale
exception, the full value of the subject property is included in the dece-
dent's gross estate.48
When reading the exception's plain language, a question of statutory
interpretation arises; while a "bona fide sale for adequate and full consid-
eration" includes a sale for the fair market value of the fee simple interest
in the property, does it also include a sale for the fair market value of the
remainder interest in the property?49 In the 1960s, the Tax Court and two
circuit courts held that the exception only includes a sale for the fair mar-
ket value of the fee simple interest in the property.50
16 (stating that § 2036(a) discourages manipulative transfers of testamentary re-
mainder interests).
46. See I.R.C. § 2036(a); see also DUKEMINIER & JoHANsoN, supra note 1, at
1027-28 (summarizing application of § 2036(a)). Section 2036(a) includes two
types of lifetime transfers in the gross estate (1) retained life estates and (2) situa-
tions in which the transferor controls the enjoyment. See id. at 1028 (explaining
scope of § 2036(a)). Although under § 2036(a)(1), the life estate terminates at
death, the transfer is subject to estate taxation because the decedent retained the
"right to possess and enjoy the property, or the right to its income, for life." Id.
Section 2036(a) (2) applies to transfers in which the transferor retains the "right to
control beneficial enjoyment of the property" even though the transferor cannot
exercise this right to personally benefit. Id. For example, when the transferor
designates herself as a cotrustee and the "trustees have a discretionary power to
accumulate trust income or distribute it to the beneficiary," the transfer is subject
to estate tax. Id. For the text of § 2036(a), see supra note 13.
47. See Lorey, supra note 13, at 188-91 (discussing legislative and judicial his-
tory of § 2036(a)).
48. See I.R.C. § 2036(a). To meet the § 2036(a) exception, the remainder-
interest transfer must not only be for a full and adequate consideration, but the
sale must also be bona fide. See id. Inherent in the meaning of a bona fide sale is
an arm's length transaction. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 718-23 (discussing bona
fide sales and arm's length transactions). In an arm's length transaction, both
parties must receive a value equal to the property they are surrendering to avoid
estate tax. See id. at 718 (noting that transaction must be true bargain and not
merely testamentary or with donative intent). For the text of § 2036(a), including
the bona fide sale exception, see supra note 13.
49. See Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 312-18 (3d Cir.
1996) (analyzing whether bona fide sale exception includes sale of remainder in-
terest for fair market value), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997). For a discussion of
the Third Circuit's ruling on this issue, see infra notes 122-92 and accompanying
text.
50. See United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 12 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that fair
market value of transferred property is includible in decedent's gross estate for
estate tax purposes); United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 917-18 (10th Cir. 1961)
(same); Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012, 1021-22 (1963) (same).
For a discussion of Past, Allen and Gregory, see infra notes 51-65 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the Past, Allen and Gregory
holdings and their applicability to the bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a), see
infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
1962 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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First, in United States v. Allen,51 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit applied the adequate and full consideration test by com-
paring the fee simple value of the property that the decedent actually
transferred to the value of the property received.5 2 In Allen, the decedent
created an irrevocable inter vivos trust in which she retained a partial life
estate and gifted the remainder interest (and the rest of the life estate) to
her children. 53 The decedent later sold the rest of her life estate to her
son for more than the fair market value. 54 The decedent's executor ar-
gued that because the decedent sold her retained life estate for its fair
market value, none of the trust property should be included in her es-
51. 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961).
52. Id. at 918 (stating that "[i]t seems certain" Congress intended only to ex-
empt those transfers where consideration was equal to full value of underlying
property). The Allen court noted that, in this case, § 2036's predecessor, § 811 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, applied because the decedent passed away
before the 1954 enactment of § 2036. Id. at 917 n.i. Section 811 provided, in
pertinent part:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of death of all property, ... (c) Transfers
in contemplation of, or taking effect at, death. (1) General Rule. To the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise-(A) in
contemplation of his [or her] death; or (B) under which he has retained
for his life . . . (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property ....
Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 811 (1939)).
53. Id. at 916 (noting that decedent created irrevocable trust when she re-
served 60% of income for life, with remainder to pass to her two children). Her
two children were also the beneficiaries of the remaining 40% of the trust income.
See id.
54. See id. at 916-17 (stating that decedent's son paid $5,000 more than fair
market value for decedent's life estate). When the decedent was 78 years old, her
attorney advised that by retaining the life estate in the trust, 60% of its value would
be included in her estate for estate tax purposes. See id. at 916. At that time, the
actuarial value of the life estate was approximately $135,000 and her 60% share of
the corpus was valued at approximately $900,000. See id. Ultimately, the dece-
dent's son purchased the life estate for $140,000. See id. at 916-17. The son now
owned the life estate "per autre vie," that is, he owned a life estate measured by the
life of his mother. See generally BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1135 (6th ed. 1990) (de-
fining "per autre vie"). The Allen court stated that the son expected that his
mother's life span would be sufficient for him to return a profit on his investment.
Allen, 293 F.2d at 917, In addition, the Allen court also considered the decedent's
son to be a bona fide third-party purchaser because he was not in the position to
benefit from any reduction in his mother's estate taxes. Id.
Although the decedent was in good health at the time of the transfers, she
discovered shortly thereafter that she had an incurable disease, which resulted in
her death. See id. Thus, her son suffered a considerable loss on his $140,000 in-
vestment because his income interest terminated. See id. The IRS determined that
the decedent's gross estate should include 60% of the corpus, less the $140,000
paid by her son for the life estate, because "(1) the transfer was invalid because [it
was] made in contemplation of death, and (2) the sale was not for an adequate
and full consideration." Id.
15
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tate.55 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that consideration is ade-
quate only if it equals or exceeds the value of the interest that would
otherwise be included in the gross estate without the transfer.56
Two years later, in Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner,5 7 the Tax Court
applied the adequate and full consideration test by comparing the fee sim-
ple value of the property that the decedent transferred with the value of
55. See Allen, 293 F.2d at 917 (noting that after paying taxes which IRS
claimed decedent's estate owed, decedent's executor brought suit for refund as-
serting that because sale of decedent's life interest was for adequate consideration,
it should not be includible in decedent's gross estate). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that Allen's narrow issue was
[w] hether the corpus of a reserved life estate is removed, for federal es-
tate tax purposes, from a decedent's gross estate by a transfer at the value
of such reserved life estate. In other words, must the consideration be
paid for the interest transferred, or for the interest which would other-
wise be included in the gross estate?
Id.
56. See id. (rejecting estate's argument despite acknowledging that decedent
only owned life estate and could not reasonably expect to sell it for fee simple
value). The court reasoned:
It does not seem plausible ... that Congress intended to allow such an
easy avoidance of the taxable incidence befalling reserved life estates.
This result would allow a taxpayer to reap the benefits of property for his
lifetime and, in contemplation of death, sell only the interest entitling
him to the income, thereby removing all of the property which he has
enjoyed from his gross estate. Giving the statute a reasonable interpreta-
tion, we cannot believe this to be its [intent]....
Id. at 918 (citations omitted). The Allen court also cited the view of a commentator
who distinguished tax law and property law regarding the interpretation of
§ 2036(a). Id. at 918 n.2 (citing Charles L.B. Lowndes, Cutting the "Strings" on Inter
Vivos Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 43 MINN. L. REV. 57, 70-71 (1958)). Profes-
sor Lowndes stated:
[T]he determination of what interest is transferred in contemplation of
death and what is adequate consideration to prevent a transfer in con-
templation of death from being taxable, should be made on the basis of
the tax effect of the transfer and the effect of the consideration on the
transferor's taxable estate, rather than by the comparatively irrelevant
rules of property law.
Lowndes, supra, at 71.
Some commentators agree with the Allen court's result, but reject its interpre-
tation of § 2036(a). See, e.g., Abendroth, supra note 6, at 53 (noting that Allen
transaction had potential for tax avoidance that does not exist in remainder-inter-
est transfers); Lorey, supra note 13, at 205 n.114 (arguing that Allen court cited no
direct authority for its interpretation that it should weigh value of consideration
against underlying property value). If Allen had ruled for the estate, a taxpayer
could keep an income interest in gifted property for many years and at an old age,
when the life estate's actuarial value is low, sell the life estate and completely avoid
estate taxation. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 55 (distinguishing life estates from
remainder interests and stating that remainder interest transfers do not have same
potential for abuse as life estates when transferred at their fair market value). For
a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of Allen, see infra notes 140-41
and accompanying text.
57. 39 T.C. 1012 (1963).
1964
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the consideration received. 58 Gregory involved a testamentary disposition
of community property. 59 In Gregory, the consideration that the decedent
received was grossly inadequate, regardless of the manner in which the
court valued it.60 The Tax Court concluded that § 2036(a) only excepts
58. Id. at 1015. The decedent had exchanged a remainder interest worth
$65,925.08 for a life estate worth $11,926.96. See id. at 1017. When the decedent
died, the property that the decedent had exchanged appreciated to $102,420.69.
See id. at 1015. The Gregory court compared the $11,926.96 that the decedent re-
ceived as consideration with the value of the transferred property as of the date of
the decedent's death and found the consideration inadequate. Id. at 1015-16.
Therefore, because the transfer failed the § 2036(a) exception, the decedent's es-
tate included the full value of the underlying property, less the $11,926.96 consid-
eration. See id. at 1022.
59. Id. at 1013-15 (detailing decedent's husband's will). Gregory was a
"widow's election" case. See id. at 1013. In a typical "widow's election" case, the
husband passed the remainder interest in all of the marital property to his chil-
dren, while providing for the lifetime needs of his wife. See Estate of D'Ambrosio v.
Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining "widow's election"
wills), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997). In a community property state, however,
half of the marital property belongs to the wife as a matter of law. See id. There-
fore, the husband could not legally devise the property by his will. See id. To avoid
this problem, the couple's attorney drafts the will to give the wife a choice between
keeping a one-half share of the estate in fee simple and receiving nothing from her
spouse or putting half of the community property in a trust, thereby exchanging
her remainder interest for a life estate in the whole. See id.; see alsoJordan, supra
note 5, at 679 n.30 (describing widow's election wills). See generally Stanley M. Jo-
hanson, Revocable Trusts, Widow's Election Wills, and Community Property: The Tax
Problems, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1247, 1253-57 (1969) (detailing tax concerns for "widow's
election" wills).
In Gregory, by the terms of the decedent's husband's will, the decedent "was
required to elect to either (a) take her share in the community property, or (b)
permit her share of the community property to pass into the testamentary trust
under said will." Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1013. At the time of the decedent's husband's
death, he left community property worth $186,104.44, in which the decedent had
an equal one-half interest under California law. See id. Thus, the decedent's hus-
band's gross estate was only worth $93,052.22, while the remaining half was ex-
cluded as community property. See id. The decedent elected to let her interest in
the community property "pass" into the testamentary trust created under her hus-
band's will. See id. The decedent contributed $65,925.08 (her remainder interest
in her portion of the community property) into the testamentary trust and re-
ceived her husband's life estate in return. See id. at 1013-15. The life estate's actua-
rial value was only $11,926.96 because the decedent was 77 years old at the time of
the election. See id. at 1013, 1017.
60. Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1015-16. The Gregory court noted that the decedent
received inadequate consideration no matter how the court calculated the value of
the consideration. Id. The court compared the value of the property transferred
as of the date of the decedent's death to the consideration received at the time of
transfer. See id. The Third Circuit has rejected the use of the date-of-death value
when comparing the value of the underlying property with the consideration that
the decedent received. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313 (stating that Third Circuit
will compare value of remainder interest that decedent transferred with value of
consideration that decedent received as of date of transfer). In Gregory, the actua-
rial value of her husband's life estate was just $11,926.96, while the value of the
property that the decedent transferred was $65,925.08 as of the date of transfer.
Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1013, 1017. At the time of the decedent's death, the property
1997] CASEBRIEF 1965
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those bona fide sales in which the consideration that the decedent re-
ceived was of a comparable value to the value that would be included in
the transferor's gross estate.
6 1
Finally, in United States v. Past,62 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the decedent's transfer did not meet the
bona fide sale exception because the value of the retained life estate re-
ceived was inadequate in relation to the value of the underlying property
exchanged. 63 Past involved a divorce settlement in which the decedent
sold her remainder in one-half of the marital property in exchange for a
life estate in the whole property. 64 The court compared one-half of the
property's fee simple value with the value of the life estate received and
found that the decedent did not receive full and adequate
consideration .65
value appreciated to $102,420.69. See id. at 1015. For further discussion of the
Third Circuit's opinion of Gregoy, see infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
61. See Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1016 ("[Section 2036(a)] excepts only those bona
fide sales where the consideration received was of a comparable value which would
be includable in the transferor's gross estate." (citing Estate ofJohn M. Goetchius,
17 T.C. 495 (1951)). In Goetchius, the Tax Court stated that "there must be the
kind of consideration which in an arm's length business transaction provides the
transferor of property with the full value thereof, in exchange." Goetchius, 17 T.C.
at 503.
62. 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965).
63. Id. at 13-14 (comparing value of life estate that decedent received with
value of transferred property).
64. Id. at 13. In 1954, the decedent and her husband entered into a property
settlement incident to their divorce. See id. at 9. Because of the decedent's alcohol
addiction, her husband did not want her to own any of the couple's valuable busi-
ness assets, but he did want her to have a comfortable income. See id. The value of
the property owned by the decedent and her husband totaled $848,746.08. See id.
at 11. The decedent's husband received property valued at $293,887.74, while the
decedent received property valued at $21,000 and a life estate in a trust created by
the property settlement. See id. The trust received property valued at $487,976.00,
while a cleanup fund, set up to satisfy certain joint obligations, totaled $45,880.34.
See id. The decedent and her husband intended that all of the property trans-
ferred to the trust was owned by the spouses equally at the time of transfer and that
the transfer was a joint transfer. See id. at 10-11. Under the terms of the trust, the
decedent received all of the income for life with the remainder going to their
children. See id. at 10. At the time of the settlement, the decedent was 44 years old
and had a life expectancy of approximately 28 years. See id. at 11. Therefore, the
trial court valued the life estate as "substantially greater than" $286,691.95. Id. at
13 n.3. On December 25, 1956, the decedent's second husband murdered her.
See id. at 11. The IRS, relying on § 2036(a), determined that the decedent's estate
should include the entire corpus of the trust, valued at $642,788.66 as of the date
of the decedent's death. See id.
65. See id. at 13-14 (noting that decedent realized approximately 60% of ac-
tual value of trust). The value of the trust was $487,978 from which the decedent
had contributed half or $243,989. See id. at 13. She received a life estate in the
trust income worth $286,691.95. See id. at 13-14. The court noted that the dece-
dent contributed one-half of the life estate value and her first husband contributed
the other half. See id. Therefore, the court reasoned that the decedent really only
received her first husband's contributed portion, $143,346. See id. at 14. Thus,
because the decedent transferred $243,989 and received only $143,346, the court
1966 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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C. Sale-of-Remainder-Interest Technique
Despite adverse case law in the 1960s, the sale of a remainder interest
was a popular estate planning device in the early and middle 1980s.6 6 The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) triggered the growth of this technique by
reversing the course of the precedent of the 1960s and accepting the no-
tion that a remainder interest sold at fair market value meets the bona fide
sale exception of § 2036(a) .67 As long as a remainder interest was sold for
a value derived from the tables in the Estate Tax Regulations, the dece-
dent was deemed to have received the full and adequate consideration
contemplated by § 2036(a). 68
In practice, estate planners recommended the sale-of-remainder-in-
terest technique to clients who owned strong growth assets that they ulti-
mately wanted to pass on to their heirs.69 Thus, a client would sell the
remainder interest to his or her children for an amount equal to the value
of the remainder interest determined by the IRS actuarial tables, while
retaining a life estate in the property. 70 If the planner valued the underly-
concluded that she did not receive adequate and full consideration for the pur-
poses of § 2036(a). See id.
Therefore, the Past court compared the value of the consideration that the
decedent received with the full fee simple value of the property that the decedent
transferred. Id. The decedent, however, only transferred the remainder interest
of her portion of the couple's property because she retained the life estate. See id.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the transaction as if the decedent transferred her
entire interest. See id. For a discussion on the Third Circuit's criticism of the
Ninth Circuit's application of § 2036(a), see infra notes 146-48 and accompanying
text.
66. See generally Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49 (noting that sale of remainder
interest technique was "hot" estate planning technique in early and middle 1980s).
67. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,145,012 (July 20, 1981) (addressing case in which
decedents sold remainder interest in real property for fair market value, but not at
property's fee simple value). In this private letter ruling, the IRS found that the
decedents' life estate expired and was not property of the estate under § 2033 of
the Code. See id. Thus, the IRS ruled that the decedent's transfer was for sufficient
consideration. See id.; see also Lorey, supra note 13, at 187 (discussing IRS accept-
ance of remainder-interest sales). The IRS valued the transfer using the tables in
the Estate Tax Regulations. See id. at 187 n.19 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f)
(as amended in 1990) (providing actuarial tables that decedent used to value re-
mainder interest)).
68. See Lorey, supra note 13, at 187-88 (concluding that remainder-interest
sale relies on statutory language and legal theories that IRS recognized); see also
Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,145,012 (July 20, 1981) (finding that when decedents sold re-
mainder interest for value derived from tables in Estate Tax Regulations, dece-
dents received full and adequate consideration contemplated by § 2036(a)).
69. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49 (describing typical scenario employing
use of sale-of-remainder-interest technique).
70. See id. (explaining operation of sale-of-remainder-interest technique); see
also Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d) (6) (as amended in 1990) (providing actuarial ta-
bles to determine present value of remainder interest based on life expectancy of
life tenant); Lorey, supra note 13, at 187-88 (discussing early 1980s acceptance by
IRS of actuarial value as adequate consideration for remainder interests).
The regulation's tables provide the ratios to compute the present value of the
remainder interest based upon the transferor's actuarial life expectancy. See Treas.
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ing asset correctly and used the IRS actuarial tables properly, the transfer
met the bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a) and would not cause the
IRS to include the property in the client's estate. 7 1 In the 1980s, the bene-
fit of the technique derived from the IRS valuation tables, which assumed
that assets yielded a ten-percent income return and did not appreciate. 72
The consequence of this assumption was that the tables undervalued re-
mainder interests in growth investment assets. 73
D. Congressional Response to the Sale-of-Remainder-Interest Technique
Congress reacted to circumvention of estate taxes through the sales of
remainder interests by enacting § 2036(c) in 1987 and its successor,
Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(6). If the interest to be valued is to take effect after the death
of an individual, the present value of the remainder interest is calculated by multi-
plying the value of the property by the appropriate remainder-interest actuarial
factor in Table S of the regulations. See id. § 20.2031-7(d) (2) (ii) (providing calcu-
lation for determining present value of remainder interest); id. § 20.2031-7(d) (6)
(providing actuarial factors); see also I.R.C. § 7520 (1994) (providing applicable
interest rate for use in Table S); Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-3(b) (as amended in 1990)
(pertaining to certain limitations on use of actuarial tables). For an example show-
ing how to apply Table S to compute a remainder-interest actuarial value, see supra
note 7.
71. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49 (concluding that upon death of client,
life estate terminates and property passes unburdened by estate tax to
remainderperson if follow actuarial tables); see also I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1994) (stating
general rule of transfer with retained life estate is to include full value of underly-
ing asset in decedent's estate unless transfer was bona fide sale made for full and
adequate consideration). For the pertinent text of § 2036(a), see supra note 13.
72. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49 (stating IRS actuarial tables based on
Treasury bond model). The result was that "the tables undervalued remainder
interests in typical growth investment assets like stock or real estate." Id.; see also
Gans, supra note 7, at 766-77 (detailing explanation of how taxpayers could benefit
from disparities between table rates and market rates).
In 1988, Congress amended § 7520 of the Code to make the table rate more
reflective of current market rates. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3668 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 7520). Section 7520 sets the rate for Table S at 120% of the federal midterm rate
as determined under § 1274(d)(1). See I.R.C. § 7520(a) (2); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-
7(d) (6) (providing "Table S"); see also I.R.C. § 1274(d) (1) (adjusting federal
midterm rate monthly to reflect changes in market rate). One commentator still
considered § 7520's rate to be inappropriately high and noted that rates estab-
lished in other code sections are lower. See Gans, supra note 7, at 773 n.22 (requir-
ing lower rate in case of interest-free or below-market loans) (citing I.R.C. § 7872).
This commentator stated: "Ironically, to the extent that § 7520 set the table rate at
too high a level, it failed to completely eliminate the opportunity for rate benefit
that taxpayers had enjoyed prior to its enactment." Id.
73. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49 (noting that effect of this assumption is
apparent when one considers both unprecedented growth of real estate market in
middle 1980s and strong bull market); cf. Gans, supra note 7, at 773 n.22 (asserting
that this advantage still exists under amended Code). See generally Jordan, supra
note 5, at 700-04 (discussing and providing example of how taxpayers can use actu-
arial assumptions to their advantage).
1968
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§ 2702, in 1990.74 Section 2036(c) eliminated the bona fide sale excep-
tion of § 2036(a) for remainder-interest transfers to lineal descendants. 75
Congress repealed § 2036(c) in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 199076 and replaced it with § 2702 to ensure a more accurate valuation
of remainder interests. 77 Generally, the value of a transferred remainder
interest equals its actuarial value. 78 For remainder interests transferred to
family members after October 8, 1990, -however, the remainder interest
must be valued by the special valuation rules of § 2702.79
74. See I.R.C. § 2702 (1994) (seeking to eliminate tax benefits provided by
techniques like sale of remainder interest); see also I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1988) (elimi-
nating bona fide exception of § 2036(a) for remainder interests to lineal descend-
ants), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
tit. XI, § 11601(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1490.
75. See I.R.C. § 2036(c) (stating that "the exception ... for a bona fide sale
shall not apply to a transfer [of a remainder interest] . . .if such transfer is to a
member of the transferor's family"); see also Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49 (noting,
"in most practitioners' minds," enactment of § 2036(c) confirmed that sale of re-
mainder interest worked).
76. Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XI, § 11601(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1490.
77. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 705 (stating that § 2702 precludes manipulat-
ing IRS actuarial tables to understate value of remainder interests).
78. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (a) (1) (i) (as amended in 1990) (noting that
fair market value of transferred remainder interest equals fair market value of un-
derlying asset less actuarial value of interest or interests retained by transferor).
For the purposes of this regulation, the fair market value of the underlying prop-
erty less the actuarial value of the retained interest always equals the actuarial value
of the transferred remainder interest. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 705 n.159.
79. See Jordan, supra note 5, at 705 ("Remainder interests transferred after
October 8, 1990, 'to (or for the benefit of) a member of the taxpayer's. . . family'
must be valued for gift tax purposes using the special valuation rules of Section
2702 of the Code."); see also I.R.C. § 2702 (providing valuation rules for family
members). Section 2702 provides:
(a) Valuation rules.-
(1) In general. -- Solely for purposes'of determining whether a
transfer of an interest in trust to (or for the benefit of) a mem-
ber of the transferor's family is a gift (and the value of such
transfer), the value of any interest in such trust retained by the
transferor or any applicable family member (as defined in sec-
tion 2701(e) (2)) shall be determined as provided in paragraph
(2).
(2) Valuation of retained interests.-
(A) In general.-The value of any retained interest which is not a
qualified interest shall be treated as being zero.
(B) Valuation of qualified interest. - The value of any retained
interest which is a qualified interest shall be determined
under section 7520.
(3) Exceptions.-
(A) In general.-This subsection shall not apply to any trans-
fer-
(i) to the extent such transfer is an incomplete transfer, or
(ii) if such transfer involves the transfer of an interest in
trust all the property in which consists of a residence to
be used as a personal residence by persons holding
term interest in such trust.
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Whether § 2702's special valuation rules for family-member transfers
apply depends upon the nature of the retained interest and the nature of
the underlying property.8 0 The general rule of § 2702's special valuation
provision is that the value of the remainder interest equals the value of the
underlying property.8 1 To accomplish this, the value of the retained inter-
est is artificially set at zero.8 2 Section 2702's general rule recognizes both
the failure of the actuarial tables to account for appreciation and the po-
tential this failure creates for manipulating the investment of the underly-
ing property so that the actuarial value of the remainder interest surpasses
its actual value.8 3 Therefore, the general rule effectively treats the remain-
der-interest transfer as if the taxpayer transferred the property in fee sim-
ple to the remainderperson and merely delays when the remainderperson
will take possession.
84
(B) Incomplete transfer. - For purposes of subparagraph (A),
the term "incomplete transfer" means any transfer which
would not be treated as a gift whether or not consideration
was received for such a transfer....
Id. § 2702(a) (emphasis added). Section 2704(c) (2) states that "[t]he term 'mem-
ber of the family' means, with respect to any individual-(A) such individual's
spouse, (B) any ancestor or lineal descendant of such individual or such individ-
ual's spouse, (C) any brother or sister of the individual, and (D) any spouse of any
individual described in subparagraph (B) or (C)." Id. § 2704(c) (2). For a further
discussion of the definition of "family members," see supra note 21, infra notes 200-
02 and accompanying text. For the text of § 2702(b), applying to qualified inter-
ests, see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
80. See I.R.C. § 2702 (discussing various circumstances when special valuation
rules for family members apply).
81. See id. § 2702(a) (2) (A) (setting value of retained interest at zero); see also
Jordan, supra note 5, at 705 n.162 ("Because the value of a transferred remainder
interest equals the value of the underlying asset less the value of the interest re-
tained by the transferor, the effect of ... [§ 2702's] general rule is to make the
value of the remainder interest equal to the value of the underlying asset." (citing
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (a) (1) (i))). Therefore, "[t] hese rules preclude manipulat-
ing the actuarial assumptions to understate the value of a transferred remainder
interest." Id. at 705.
82. See I.R.C. § 2702(a) (2) (A) ("The value of any retained interest which is
not a qualified interest shall be treated as being zero."). For a discussion of quali-
fied interests, see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
83. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 706 (noting that general rule assumes exact
opposite of actuarial tables).
84. See id. at 706-07 (stating that taxpayers will seek to shift wealth to
remainderperson to fullest extent possible and invest property so that entire re-
turn is realized as appreciation). Thus, if the transferor structures the remainder-
interest transfer so that he or she may manipulate the investment of the underly-
ing property yield so that it is less than the expected income, the transferor is
taxed as if he or she transferred the property outright. See id. at 707 (discussing
effect of § 2702's general rule). One commentator stated: "To the extent that the
transferor receives income payments [ I made to the taxpayer as holder of the
income interest, there is double taxation." Id. at 707 n.168. This effect would
occur because the Code includes the income payments in the transferor's gross
estate "even though the present value of the income payments is subject to the gift
tax at the time of the transfer of the remainder interest." Id.
1970
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The Code has two primary exceptions to these special valuation
rules. 85 First, the remainder interest is excluded from the general rule if
the taxpayer retains a qualified interest.8 6 If the taxpayer retains either a
qualified annuity interest or a qualified unitrust interest, the value of the
remainder interest is its actuarial value. 87 The second exception to
§ 2702's general rule applies when the taxpayer transfers a remainder in-
terest in his or her personal residence.
8 8
85. See I.R.C. § 2702 (providing qualified interest exception and personal resi-
dence exception).
86. See id. § 2702 (a) (2) (B), (b) (exempting any retained interest that is quali-
fied interest from general rule). For the purposes of § 2702, a qualified interest
means:
(1) any interest which consists of the right to receive fixed amounts paya-
ble not less frequently than annually,
(2) any interest which consists of the right to receive amounts which are
payable not less frequently than annually and are a fixed percentage
of the fair market value of the property in the trust (determined an-
nually), and
(3) any noncontingent remainder interest if all of the other interests in
the trust consist of interests described in paragraph (1) or (2).
Id. § 2702(b). Section 2702(b)(1) is known as a qualified annuity interest and
§ 2702(b) (2) is known as a qualified unitrust interest. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at
707-11 (explaining qualified interests).
87. See I.R.C. § 2702(a) (2) (B); see also id. § 2702(b)(1) (defining "qualified
annuity interest"); id. § 2702(b) (2) (defining "qualified unitrust interest"). As one
commentator notes, "the value of a remainder interest that follows a retained qual-
ified interest equals the value of the underlying [property] less the actuarial value
of the retained interest, or the actuarial value of the remainder interest." Jordan,
supra note 5, at 707 n.172 (citing I.R.C. §§ 2702(a) (2) (B), 7520(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-5 (as amended in 1990)). For a detailed discussion of qualified annuity
interests and qualified unitrust interests, see Jordan, supra note 5, at 707-11.
88. See I.R.C. § 2702(a) (3) (ii) (stating that special valuation rules of § 2702
will not apply "if [transfer with retained interest] involves the transfer of an inter-
est in trust all the property in which consists of a residence to be used as a personal
residence by persons holding term interests in such trust"). The Treasury Regula-
tions limit the taxpayer to two residences that may qualify for this exemption: a
principal residence and one other residence. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(b) (2),
(c)(2) (as amended in 1992). The regulations also place severe restrictions on
such transfers to prevent a transferor from using the personal residence exception
to circumvent the general rule. See id. § 25.2702-5(b) (3), (c)(2).
To qualify for this exception, the remainder interest transfer must be accom-
plished by a personal residence trust or a qualified personal residence trust. See id.
§ 25.2702-5(a) (limiting exception); see alsojordan, supra note 5, at 712 n.199 (ex-
plaining that primary distinctions between personal residence trust and qualified
personal residence trust involve amount of cash each trust may hold and whether
trust may sell personal residence that it holds). If the transferor uses a personal
residence trust to transfer a remainder interest in his or her personal residence,
the value of the retained interest is its actuarial value. See id. at 712 (discussing use
of personal residence trust) (citing I.R.C. §2702(a)(3)(ii); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512.5). For a detailed discussion of the personal residence exception, see id.
at 711-15.
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Section 2702 effectively terminated the sale-of-remainder-interest
technique with regard to interfamily transfers. 89 For transfers to non-
family members, the proper value of the remainder interest is its actuarial
value. 90 Congress intended this Code section to apply to transfers after
October 8, 1990 and did not intend it to be retroactive. 9 1 Subsequent case
law, however, narrowed the bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a) by effec-
tively applying the policy of § 2702 retroactively to the 1980s transactions
and prospectively to non-family-member transfers.9 2
89. See I.R.C. § 2702(a) (stating that remainder interest transferred after Oc-
tober 8, 1990, "to (or for the benefit of) a member of the transferor's family" must
be valued for gift tax purposes using section's special valuation rules). Generally,
if the retained interest does not qualify under one of § 2702's narrow exceptions,
the value of any retained interest is zero. See id. § 2702 (a) (2) (A) (listing specific
exceptions). Thus, the IRS values the remainder interest at the value of the under-
lying property. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 723 (stating that when remainder inter-
est is sold to family member, § 2702 prevents seller from shifting wealth to
remainderpersons tax free by "redefining adequate consideration for purposes of
the gift tax to equal the value of the underlying property"); see also Treas. Reg.
25.2512-5(a) (1) (i) (stating general rule for remainder-interest valuation). There-
fore, a transferor selling a remainder interest to a family member can avoid having
§ 2036(a) include the full value of the underlying property in his or her estate, if
the transferor sells the interest for the value of the underlying property. See I.R.C.
§ 2036(a) (1994) (providing that if holder of retained life estate transfers such
estate, value of gross estate will include value of all property, including value of
transferred estate).
These rules preclude using the IRS actuarial tables to understate the value of a
transferred remainder interest when the transferor is selling the remainder inter-
est to a family member. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 705 (discussing § 2702's policy
to prevent manipulation). The members of a transferor's family include the trans-
feror's spouse; any ancestor, lineal descent or spouse of an ancestor or lineal de-
scendant of the transferor or the transferor's spouses; and the transferor's
brothers and sisters and their spouses. See I.R.C. §§ 2702(e), 2704(c) (2) (defining
term "member of the family"). For further discussion of who is a "member of the
family," see supra notes 21, 79 and 200-02.
90. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (a) (1) (i) (explaining that fair market value of
transferred remainder interest equals fair market value of underlying asset less ac-
tuarial value of interest or interests retained by transferor). For the purposes of
this regulation, the value of the underlying property less the actuarial value of the
retained interest always equals the actuarial value of the remainder interest. See
Jordan, supra note 5, at 705 n.159 (discussing how to determine worth of transfer
for nonfamily members).
91. See I.R.C. § 2702 (applying to transfers after October 8, 1990); see also
Abendroth, supra note 6, at 50 (noting that § 2702 did not affect pre-1990 remain-
der-interest transfers). See generally I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1988) (applying similar rules
for family-member transfers from December 17, 1987 until October 8, 1990), re-
pealed 6y Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, tit. XI, § 11601 (a), Pub. L.
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1490.
92. See, e.g., Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 815 (1987) (concluding
that, to meet exception of § 2036(a), decedent must receive consideration equal to
value of underlying property that decedent transferred), affd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). For a further discussion of Gradow and its progeny, see infra notes 93-
121 and accompanying text.
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E. Apparent Invalidation of the Sale-of-Remainder-Interest Technique
While Congress was attempting to reduce the use of the sale-of-re-
mainder-interest technique, the Court of Claims's interpretation of the
§ 2036(a) bona fide sale exception in Gradow v. United States9 3 effectively
invalidated the technique. 9 4 The Gradow court held that the price paid for
a remainder interest must equal the value of the entire property at the
time of the transfer.95 Gradow was a widow's election case in which the
surviving spouse elected to transfer her interest in community property to
a designated trust and retained a life estate.9 6 Following the surviving
spouse's death, her executor claimed that her transfer to the trust was for
adequate and full consideration because the life estate she received in her
husband's property exceeded the value of the remainder interest in the
property she relinquished.
97
The Court of Claims accepted the IRS's argument that, for the pur-
poses of § 2036(a), the decedent did not transfer a remainder interest, but
rather she transferred her entire interest in the community property.
98
93. 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), affd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
94. Id. at 813, 815 (holding that sale of remainder interest for its fair market
value is insufficient consideration for purposes of § 2036(a) bona fide sale
exception).
95. Id. at 812-13 (discussing reasoning for limiting scope of bona fide sale
exception).
96. Id. at 809 (noting that decedent sought to control both shares of commu-
nity property by creating trust). For a discussion of "widow's election" cases, see
supra note 59.
Decedent and her husband were residents of California, a community prop-
erty state. See Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 809. The decedent's husband's will gave his
wife an election. See id. If she opted to reject the will, she would only receive her
one-half share of the community property. See id. If she chose to take under the
will, however, she could transfer her part of the community property into a trust
consisting of her and her husband's community property, from which she would
receive all the income for life and which would entitle her to own the couple's
residence outright. See id. Upon her death, the corpus of the trust was to go to her
son. See id.
In 1979, the decedent elected the latter option under her husband's will. See
id. Therefore, the decedent's half of the community property, exclusive of the
residence, was worth $461,610, while the life estate interest in the trust income was
$192,039. See id. Thus, the decedent received total consideration, including the
residence and other personal effects, of $300,695. See id. The value of the remain-
der interest in the community property was $211,367. See id. The decedent died in
1980. See id.
97. See Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 809 (discussing executor's claim that decedent's
transfer to trust was for adequate consideration). The executor valued the consid-
eration that the decedent received at $300,695 and valued the remainder interest
at $211,367. See id. Because the value of the retained life estate exceeded the
value of the transferred remainder interest, the executor asserted that the transfer
was for full and adequate consideration under § 2036(a). See id. In 1983, however,
the IRS asserted a deficiency in estate taxes of $162,271. See id. The executor
initially paid the deficiency and also $78,662 in interest, but in 1985 the executor
filed a claim for a refund. See id.
98. See id. at 813 ("The only way to preserve the integrity of [§ 2036(a)] . . . is
to view the consideration moving from the surviving spouse as that property which
1997] CASEBRIEF 1973
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Accordingly, the court reasoned that the adequacy of consideration re-
quired to meet the bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a) must be mea-
sured against the value of the property that would be included in the
decedent's estate, not against the value of the property transferred. 99
From this interpretation, the court found that the transfer failed to meet
the bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a) because the life estate that the
spouse received was not sufficient consideration for the full value of the
property she transferred to the trust.10 0
The Gradow court based its reasoning on statutory interpretation and
the need to "preserve" the purpose of § 2036(a). 10 1 The court initially
stated that the most natural reading of § 2036(a) leads to the result that a
remainder interest must equal the value of the entire property to meet the
bona fide sale exception.10 2 The court interpreted the term "property" in
the phrase "'the gross estate shall include ... all property . . .of which
decedent has at any time made a transfer"' as referring to the fee simple
interest of the property.10 3 The court then opined that "[flundamental
principles of grammar dictate that" the bona fide sale exception relates to
is taken out of the gross estate."). For a further discussion of the court's interpre-
tation of § 2036(a), see infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
99. Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 816. For a discussion of the court's reasoning for this
conclusion, see infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
100. See Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 813 (discussing why consideration that decedent
received was inadequate). The court of appeals noted that the decedent received
$234,767 pursuant to her election. See Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516, 518
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1990). This consideration was inadequate because the half of the
property that the decedent contributed to the trust was worth $444,641. See id. at
518 n.7.
101. Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 813 (reasoning that requirement for property trans-
fer to be bona fide sale "'for adequate and full consideration' preserves the pur-
poses of the rest of § 2036(a), because it is based on the expectation that what is
being added to the surviving spouse's assets will be subject to inclusion in the gross
estate").
102. See id. at 813 & n.6 (stating that "there is no doubt" that "property" refers
to that part of trust corpus attributable to decedent). The court was persuaded by
three cases from the 1960s that interpreted the bona fide sale exception of
§ 2036(a) to require consideration equal to the underlying value of the property.
See id. at 810-13 (citing United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961); Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner,
39 T.C. 1012 (1963)). The Gradow court asserted that the "most natural reading of
2036(a) leads to the same result." Id. at 813.
For a discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of Past, see supra notes 62-
65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of
Allen, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts,
holding and reasoning of Gregory, see supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
103. Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 813 (alterations in original) (quoting I.R.C.
§ 2036(a) (1994)). The court stated:
In the context of this case, there is no question that the term "property"
in the phrase "The gross estate shall include ... all property ... of which
decedent has at any time made a transfer" means that part of the trust
corpus attributable to plaintiff. If § 2036(a) applies, all of [decedent's]
former community property is brought into her gross estate.
Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 2036(a)).
1974 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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the same "property, i.e., the one-half of the community property [that the
decedent] placed into trust. ' 10 4 The Gradow court considered this inter-
pretation to be the most consistent with the purposes of § 2036(a).105
Under the alternative reading of § 2036(a), the Gradow court rea-
soned that as long as the surviving spouse was not elderly at the time of an
election, a couple could easily avoid taxes on one-half of the property.10 6
The court concluded that this result was contrary to the intent of Congress
and "that testamentary transfers for less than full consideration would be
brought back into the estate for tax purposes."10 7 In 1990, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment and
the interpretation of § 2036(a) by the Court of Claims.' 0 8
The Gradow decision has spawned a mixed reaction to the proper
meaning of adequate and full consideration required by the bona fide sale
exception of § 2036(a). 10 9 Although the ruling has generated negative
commentary, two district courts and the Tax Court have followed Gradow
104. Id.
105. See id. (concluding that plain language of § 2036(a) supports interpreta-
tion that "property" refers to decedent's portion of trust corpus). The court then
reasoned that treating the portion of the trust corpus attributable to the decedent
as the consideration she contributed is consistent within the purposes of
§ 2036(a). See id. The court noted that the net result of the decedent's election
was to ensure her lifetime needs and then to move the property to the next genera-
tion. See id. If she had not made the election, the decedent would have had to
include the property she received from the will in her gross estate. See id. By elect-
ing under the will, the decedent received the same benefit from the property as if
she had kept it and also ensured its transfer to her son. See id.
106. See id. The Gradow court reasoned:
If the measurement of consideration flowing from the surviving spouse in
these circumstances was limited to the remainder interest, then, as long
as the surviving spouse is not very elderly at the time of the election, it
would be a simple matter for a couple to avoid estate tax on half of their
property.
Id.
107. See id. (concluding this simple tax avoidance scheme "is plainly not how
Congress contemplated 2036(a) would operate").
108. See Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the decedent's executor
argued that the Court of Claims's interpretation violated "commercial common
sense, normal rules of statutory interpretation, the legislative history of section
2036(a) and the long-term understanding of what constitutes 'adequate considera-
tion.'" Id. The Federal Circuit, however, was unpersuaded and stated that the
executor's arguments were not well-grounded in law. See id. The court concluded,
without independent analysis:
The ... [Court of Claims's] well reasoned opinion indicates a complete
consideration of the arguments raised here on appeal and we are unper-
suaded of any legal error in the court's interpretation or application of
section 2036(a). Accordingly, the judgment of the ... [Court of Claims]
is affirmed, and we adopt that court's more extensive analysis.
Id.
109. For a discussion of this mixed reaction from both the courts and legal
commentary, see infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
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in their holdings. 11 0 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of North Carolina, in Pittman v. United States,1" was the first court to
support Gradow.112 In Pittman, the court held that the decedents' three
remainder-interest transfers were not for full and adequate considera-
tion. ' 1 3 Therefore, the decedents' estates included the fair market values
of the three properties in the estate. 14 The Pittman court stated that "it is
110. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 445, 447 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(citing Gradow and concluding that value of what decedent received must be com-
pared to entire value of underlying property); Pittman v. United States, 878 F.
Supp. 833, 835 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (same); Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 71
T.C.M. (CCH) 1856, 1862-63 (1996) (stating that to determine whether considera-
tion is adequate, court must compare value that decedent received with total value
of property decedent transferred, rather than just remainder interest value); Estate
of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 252, 259-60 (1995) (same), rev'd, 101
F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
For a discussion of Pittman, see infra notes 111-15, 154 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Tax Court's decision in D'Ambrosio, see infra notes 116-18,
123 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the negative legal commentary
regarding the Gradow decision, see infra notes 119-21, 157-60 and accompanying
text.
111. 878 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
112. Id. at 835 (citing Gradow in reference to measurement and meaning of
consideration in context of § 2036(a)). In Pittman, the plaintiff is the daughter of
the decedents, Marjorie and Howard Arnold, as well as Howard's executrix. See id.
at 834. In 1985, Howard and Majorie conveyed remainder interests in three
properties to their daughter. See id. First, Marjorie conveyed a remainder interest
in real property ("Property A") for $124,995, consisting of $6,250 cash and a
$118,745 promissory note. See id. Property A's fair market value was $543,338. See
id. Next, Marjorie conveyed a remainder interest in a second property ("Property
B") to her daughter for $62,574, consisting of $3,129 cash and a $59,445 promis-
sory note. See id. Property B had a fair market value of $272,000. See id. Finally,
Howard conveyed a remainder interest in a third property ("Property C") for
$7,463, consisting of $373 cash and a $7,090 promissory note. See id. The fair
market value of Property C was $130,200. See id. The plaintiffs argued that with
each conveyance, both parents retained a life estate. See id.
When Marjorie died in 1988, Property A was worth $711,199 and the fair mar-
ket value of Property B was $355,750. See id. In 1989, when Howard died, Property
C had a fair market value of $207,203. See id. The decedents' estate tax returns
did not include the properties in their estate, but the estates did include the bal-
ances due on the promissory notes. See id. The IRS assessed Marjorie's and How-
ard's estate for $294,569 and $90,170 respectively. See id. The plaintiff paid these
assessments, but filed a claim for a refund in federal district court. See id.
113. See id. at 835-36 (stating that for decedent's three transfers to have met
bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a), decedents must have received at least fair
market values for properties).
114. See id. at 836 (noting that "the fair market values of the properties are
included in [Marjorie's and Howard's] estates, reduced by any consideration re-
ceived"). The court reduced these fair market values by the cash payments and the
principal reductions on the promissory notes that their daughter had made. See id.
Because of the court's ruling, the value of both Marjorie's and Howard's estates
increased significantly. See id. Upon Marjorie's death, Property A was worth
$711,199 and Marjorie had received only $15,270 for the remainder interest. See
id. The court held that the $695,929 difference should be included in Marjorie's
estate. See id. Property B was worth $355,750 on the day that Marjorie died, but
she had only received $7,645 for the remainder interest. See id. The court con-
1976 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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the value of the entire property which is measured against the considera-
tion received." 115 Furthermore, in Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner,16
the Tax Court, despite recognizing the considerable adverse legal com-
mentary, held that the decedent designed the remainder-interest transfer
for consideration equal to its actuarial value to avoid the payment of estate
cluded that the $348,105 disparity should also be included in Marjorie's estate. See
id. Upon Howard's death, Property C's value was $207,203 and Howard had re-
ceived only $1770 for the remainder interest. See id. Consequently, Howard's es-
tate increased by $205,433. See id.
115. Id. at 835. The court also stated: "Such valuation is necessary in order to
establish an equilibrium for estate tax purposes." Id. (citing Gradow v. United
States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 813-14 (1987), affid, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); cf Parker,
894 F. Supp. at 447 (concluding that, although it had reservations about Gradow
decision, estate did not meet burden of proving IRS wrong).
In Parker v. United States, the decedent died at the age of 78 after having full-
time nursing care for several years prior to her death. Id. at 445. A year before she
died, the decedent transferred $350,000 to Trust Company Bank to be included in
an investment fund. See id. at 445-46. In exchange, the decedent received the
right for income for life from the fund, which totaled $897,666. See id. at 446.
Three trusts, the remainderpersons in the fund, contributed the additional
$547,666. See id. The life estate that the decedent received was worth $257,671.
See id. at 447. The decedent received only $6000 from the fund, however, prior to
her death. See id. at 446. Her gross estate did not include the $350,000 that she
had invested in the fund. See id. The IRS assessed additional taxes on the basis
that the decedent's estate should have included the $350,000. See id.
The IRS argued that the $350,000 should be included in the decedent's gross
estate because (1) the decedent did not receive adequate and full consideration;
(2) the life estate was not capable of being valued; and (3) "the decedent retained
a beneficial interest in the property transferred." Id. at 446-47. The IRS used
Gradow as its primary support. See id. at 447. The district court stated that,
although it has some reservations about the Gradow holding, the executor did not
meet the burden of proving the IRS's interpretation of Gradow to be wrong. See id.
Therefore, the decedent's transfer did not meet the bona fide sale exception of
§ 2036(a). See id. at 448.
116. 105 T.C. 252 (1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), and cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
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tax that otherwise would have been due.1 17 Thus, the Tax Court included
the full value of the property in the decedent's estate.1 18
Legal commentators have emphasized that the Gradow rationale is in-
correct because the sale of a remainder interest for its actuarial value does
not deplete the gross estate.'1 9 In addition, commentators have discussed
117. Id. at 254 & n.4, 260 (characterizing case as one with estate planning
technique aimed at removing value of property from gross estate). In D'Ambrosio,
the decedent owned one-half of the preferred stock of Vaparo, Inc., a family-
owned corporation. See id. at 253. In 1987, the decedent, then 80 years-old, trans-
ferred the remainder interest in her shares to Vaparo in exchange for an annuity
that was to pay her $296,039 per year. See Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner,
101 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997). In addition,
the decedent retained her income interest in the shares. See D'Ambrosio, 105 T.C.
at 253. The fair market value of the stock was $2,350,000. See id. at 253-54. Ac-
cording to the IRS actuarial tables, the annuity had a fair market value of
$1,324,014. See id. at 254 & n.4. This was also the fair market value of the remain-
der interest. See id. at 253.
In 1990, the decedent died after receiving only $592,078 in annuity payments
and $23,500 in dividends. See id. at 253-54 & n.3. Her executrix did not include
any interest in the Vaparo stock when she computed the decedent's estate. See id.
at 254. The IRS, however, issued a notice of deficiency, asserting that the gross
estate included the full fee simple value of the Vaparo shares at the date of death
(estimated fair market value of $2,350,000) less the amount of annuity payments
that the decedent received during her life. See id.
The Tax Court, relying on Gradow, reasoned that the decedent's remainder-
interest transfer of her stock was an abusive tax avoidance scheme that should not
be permitted. See id. at 255, 260. The court stated:
In the instant case, we conclude that decedent's transfer of the remain-
der interest in her preferred stock does not fall within the bona fide sale
exception of section 2036(a). Decedent's gross estate would be depleted
if the value of the preferred stock, in which she had retained a life inter-
est, was excluded therefrom. Decedent's transfer of the remainder inter-
est was of a testamentary nature, made when she was 80 years old to a
family-owned corporation in return for an annuity worth more than $1
million less than the stock itself. Given our conclusion that decedent did
not receive adequate and full consideration under section 2036(a) for
her 470 shares of Vaparo preferred stock, we hold that her gross estate
includes the date of death value of that stock, less the value of the
annuity.
Id. (citing I.R.C. § 2043(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(a) (as amended in
1990)). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's appellate review of D'Ambrosio, see
infra notes 122-92 and accompanying text.
118. See D'Ambrosio, 105 T.C. at 252, 260 (holding that "decedent's gross estate
includes the date-of-death value of the stock, reduced by the value of the consider-
ation she received in return for the remainder interest").
119. SeeA.JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING § 6.15.2, at 149-53, 162-63 (5th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1997) (criticizing Gradow as lacking understanding of future inter-
ests, economics and time value of money); RicHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL
ESTATE AND Girt TAXATION 4.08[1], at 4-138 (6th ed. 1991) (stating that payment
of full consideration for remainder interest alone is sufficient under § 2036(a));
Abendroth, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that measuring adequacy of consideration
received against value of remainder interest determined by actuarial tables should
be sufficient to meet Gradow's policy argument that § 2036(a)'s bona fide sale ex-
ception is to prevent depletion of gross estate); Jordan, supra note 5, at 689-94
(arguing that Gradow decision leads to double taxation and actuarial value, not fee
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the fact that if the bona fide sale exception requires consideration equal
to the fair market value of the underlying property, the estate will be sub-
ject to double taxation. 120 Lastly, one commentator addressed the Gradow
court's lack of understanding of future interests, economics and the time
value of money.I 21
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT REVALIDATES THE SALE OF A REMAINDER
INTEREST: THE D AMBROSzO DECISION DISMISSES GRADOWAND
ITS PROGENY
In Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, the Third Circuit addressed for
the first time whether the sale of a remainder interest for its fair market
value constitutes adequate and full consideration within the meaning of
§ 2036(a). 122 The Tax Court, relying on the Federal Circuit's Gradow deci-
sion, held that although the decedent had sold her remainder interest in
closely held stock for its fair market value, § 2036(a) brought the stock's
entire fee simple value back into the estate.123 The Third Circuit, how-
simple value, is amount necessary to prevent depletion of gross estate); Peter M.
Weinbaum, Are Sales of Remainder Interest Still Available in Light of a New Decision?, 14
EST. PLAN. 258 (1987) (criticizing Gradow for quoting and analyzing § 2036(a) out
of context and for ignoring value of life estate in wife's community property as
consideration received in the transfer); Lorey, supra note 13, at 206 (asserting
Gradow was judicial overreaction and any concern that remainder interest transfer
for its actuarial value will deplete estate is unfounded). But see Joseph M. Dodge,
Transfers with Retained Interest and Powers, in TAX MANAGEMENT A-67, A-87 (1992)
(stating that Gradow reasoning is wrong according to financial theory, but justified
on pragmatic grounds). Commentators have also faulted the reasoning of the
courts that have followed Gradow. See, e.g., Jacques T. Schlenger et al., Cases Ad-
dressing Sale of Remainder Wrongly Decided, 22 EST. PLAN. 305 (1995) (criticizing Pitt-
man as "mindless" decision); Jacques T. Schlenger et al., Property Included in Estate
Despite Sale of Remainder Interest, 23 EST. PIAN. 132, 133 (1996) (criticizing Tax
Court's reasoning in D'Ambrosio).
120. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 689-90 (illustrating how requiring transferor
to sell remainder interest for fair market value of underlying property results in
double taxation).
121. See CASNER, supra note 119, § 6.15.2, at 149-53, 163 (rejecting Gradow
court's reasoning).
122. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 312.
123. See D'Ambrosio, 105 T.C. at 260. The Tax Court in D'Ambrosio principally
relied on Gradow and three 1960s cases that interpreted that a remainder interest
must be sold for the fair market value of the underlying property to meet the bona
fide sale exception of § 2036(a). Id. at 255-60 (citing United States v. Past, 347
F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961);
Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), affrd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963)).
For a discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of Gradow, see supra notes
93-108 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts, holding and reason-
ing of Past, see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
facts, holding and reasoning of Allen, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of Gregory, see supra notes 57-
61 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Tax Court's reasoning in
D'Ambrosio, see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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ever, determined that the sale of a remainder interest for its fair market
value is sufficient consideration to fall within the bona fide sale exception
of § 2036(a). 124
The Third Circuit reasoned that its interpretation of § 2036(a) was
consistent with the congressional intent to avoid depletion of the estate. 125
In addition, the cases that provided support for the Tax Court's and Com-
missioner's arguments were "inapposite or unpersuasive. '126 Moreover,
the Third Circuit considered it difficult to fathom the Commissioner's
"abusiveness" concerns about a taxpayer exchanging a remainder interest
for an annuity that has an actuarial value equal to the remainder interest's
value.1 27 Finally, the court found no evidence that the decedent made
this transfer in contemplation of death or testamentary motivation.1 28
The Commissioner asserted that the Treasury Regulations indicate
that the bona fide sale exception only applies to transfers of fee simple
interests.1 29 The IRS examined the phrase "' [t]he use, possession, right to
the income, or other enjoyment of the tranferred property"' in the Treasury
Regulations and argued that because one cannot retain a life interest in a
remainder, "property" must refer to the fee simple interest. 130 Therefore,
under this analysis, the bona fide sale exception would only exclude trans-
124. SeeD'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 312 (concluding that "sale of remainder inter-
est for its fair market value constitutes 'adequate and full consideration' within the
meaning of § 2036(a)"). Therefore, because the decedent sold the remainder in-
terest in her Vaparo stock for its actuarial value, the fee simple value of the under-
lying property is not included in the estate. See id. at 318 (concluding Tax Court
erred as matter of law by holding that consideration decedent received for her
remainder interest was not adequate and full).
125. See id. at 316-17 (dismissing "abusiveness" concerns of remainder interest
sale and illustrating how transfer of remainder interest for its fair market value
does not deplete decedent's estate).
126. See id. at 312 (criticizing decisions in Past, Allen and Gregory). For a dis-
cussion of the Third Circuit's criticism of these cases, see infra notes 138-50 and
accompanying text.
127. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316-17 (providing hypothetical to dismiss
"abusiveness" concerns). For further discussion of the Third Circuit's response to
the Commissioner's "abusiveness" concerns of the remainder-interest sale, see infra
notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
128. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 311 (discussing facts of case and finding no
evidence that decedent made transfer in contemplation of death or with testamen-
tary consideration, which would show that transfer was "abusive").
129. See id. at 315. The Treasury Regulations for § 2036(a) provide, in perti-
nent part:
A decedent's gross estate includes under section 2036 the value of any
interest in property transferred by the decedent ... except to the extent
that the transfer was for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth if the decedent retained or reserved (1) for his life ...
(i) The use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of
the transferred property ....
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (as amended in 1990).
130. D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314, 315 (emphasis added) (quoting Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1 (a)) (analyzing interpretation of regulation by Commissioner).
1980 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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fers for the full fee simple value. 13 1 The estate, however, emphasized the
words "interest" and "transferred" in the regulation. 132 The estate asked if
the drafters of the regulation meant to include the full value of the prop-
erty, why did the regulation refer to the value of any "interest in the prop-
erty transferred?"1 33 Thus, the estate maintained that "'adequate and full
consideration' must be measured against the interest transferred."
13 4
The Third Circuit recognized that the regulation does not clearly sup-
port either contention, but concluded that the more reasonable interpre-
tation is to "render inoperative" the word "transferred."'1 35 Thus, for a
property transfer to meet the bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a), the
interest transferred, whether fee simple or remainder, must be for adequate
and full consideration.1 36 Therefore, the Third Circuit interpreted the
phrase in § 2036(a) "to the extent of any interest therein" to signify that
the gross estate must include the value of the remainder interest unless
the decedent sold the remainder interest for adequate and fair
consideration. 137
The Commissioner principally relied on four cases.13 8 The Third Cir-
cuit found the Allen, Gregory, Past and Gradow decisions to be either "inap-
131. See id. at 314-15 (comparing parties arguments and concluding that "in-
terest in property" means "property" for purposes of Treasury Regulations). The
Commissioner used the Court of Claims's statutory interpretation in Gradow v.
United States as its primary support. See id. at 312, 314 (citing Gradow v. United
States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 813 (1987), affid, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). The Third
Circuit disapproved of the Gradow court's analysis and noted that when the Gradow
court quoted § 2036(a), it omitted significant portions of the language. See id.
For further discussion of the Third Circuit's criticism of the Gradow court's
reasoning, see infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
facts, holding and reasoning of Gradow, see supra notes 93-108 and accompanying
text.
132. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314-15 (explaining estate's argument for inter-
pretation of Treasury Regulation).
133. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original) (discussing estate's argument regarding
intent of regulation drafters).
134. Id.
135. See id. The Third Circuit recognized that the IRS was correct that one
cannot retain a life interest in a remainder. See id. The court states that if the
drafters of § 2036(a) meant to include the full value of the property, they would
have referred to the value of any "property," not any "interest in property" trans-
ferred. See id. Thus, the D'Ambrosio court reasoned that if some words of the regu-
lation are surplusage, it is more "reasonable and faithful" to the statutory text to
render the word "transferred" inoperative in the regulation rather than to strike
"interest" from section 20.2036-1 (a) (i) of the Treasury Regulations. Id. There-
fore, the court concluded that "the drafters meant merely to refer to the 'trans-
ferred' property so as to distinguish it from other property owned by the estate."
Id.
136. See id. (interpreting bona fide sale exception of § 2036(a) to apply to all
property interests).
137. Id. at 314 (quoting I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1994)). For the text of § 2036(a),
see supra note 13.
138. See id. at 312 (citing United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961); Gradow v. United States, 11
33
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posite or unpersuasive." 139 First, the Third Circuit found Allen to be
inapposite because the decedent sold a life estate after the remainder in-
terest had already been disposed of as a gift. 140 Thus, the Third Circuit
found that such a testamentary transaction had a tax evasion motive. 14 1
Second, the Third Circuit stated that the Gregory court erred by comparing
the consideration received with the value of the underlying property as of
the transferor's death. 142 The Third Circuit based its opinion on the fact
that when a transferor sells his or her remainder interest, it is impossible
to know what the actual value will be as of his or her death, and thus, no
Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), affd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Estate of Gregory v. Com-
missioner, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963)).
139. See id. For a discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of Gradow, see
supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts, holding
and reasoning of Past, see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the facts, holding and reasoning of Allen, see supra notes 51-56 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of Gregory, see
supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
140. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 312 (discussing and distinguishing facts of
Allen) (citing Allen, 293 F.2d at 916-17).
141. See id. The court considered Allen inapposite because the D'Ambrosio case
involved the sale of a remainder for its fair market value, a fact that the IRS con-
ceded. Id. The Third Circuit agreed with the Allen court's rationale, however, that
the "consideration should be measured against the value that would have been
drawn into the gross estate absent the transfer." Id. Referring to the persuasive
reasoning in a previous Tax Court case, the D'Ambrosio court stated:
"[W]here the transferred property is replaced by other property of equal
value received in exchange, there is no reason to impose an estate tax in
respect of the transferred property, for it is reasonable to assume that the
property acquired in exchange will find its way into the decedent's gross
estate at his death unless consumed or otherwise disposed of in a nontes-
tamentary transaction in much the same manner as would the transferred
property itself had the transfer not taken place....
In short, unless replaced by property of equal value that could be
exposed to inclusion in the decedent's gross estate, the property transferred
in a testamentary transaction of the type described in the statute must be
included in his gross estate."
Id. at 312-13 (emphasis added) (quoting Estate of Frothingham v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 211, 215-16 (1973)). For a further discussion of the facts, holding and
reasoning of Allen, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
142. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313 (stating that Gregory court erred in its anal-
ysis, but still reached correct result). The Gregory court compared what the dece-
dent's property had appreciated to at her death to the consideration she had
received eight years earlier. Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1015-16. The Third Circuit
responded:
There is no way to know ex ante what the value of an asset will be at the
death of a testator; although the date of death can be estimated through
the use of actuarial tables, the actual appreciation of the property is un-
knowable, as are the prevailing interest, inflation and tax rates. Conse-
quently, there is no way to ever be certain in advance whether the
consideration is adequate and thus no way to know what tax treatment a
transfer will receive.
D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313.
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one would ever have incentive to sell a remainder interest. 143 Therefore,
because Congress did not expressly provide for how the consideration
should be measured, the Third Circuit determined that courts should
compare the value of the consideration received with the fair market value
as of the date of the transfer.144 Additionally, the Third Circuit consid-
ered the Commissioner's use of Gregory as support to be misplaced because
the consideration given to the Gregory decedent was grossly inadequate,
regardless of the valuation date.
1 45
Third, the Third Circuit found that the Past court erred when analyz-
ing a divorce settlement transaction by comparing the value of the life
estate that the decedent received under the divorce settlement with the
value of the whole property. 1 46 The Third Circuit reasoned that the Past
court should have compared the value of the remainder interest that the
decedent relinquished under the divorce settlement with the value of the
143. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313 (concluding that incentive for sale of re-
mainder interest is destroyed if Gregory court was correct in its analysis).
144. See id. (stating that court ."will compare the value of the remainder trans-
ferred to the value of the consideration received"). The Third Circuit asserted
that Congress never said in § 2036(a) that all remainder-interest transfers will be
taxed at their fee simple value or that those transfers are illegal. See id.; see also
I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1994) (discussing when remainder-interest sale is included in
estate, but not expressing blanket aversion to remainder-interest transfers).
Rather, the court stated that Congress clearly contemplated situations in which a
remainder-interest sale would not cause the full value of the property to fall into
the estate. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313; see also I.R.C. § 2036(a) (providing ex-
ception for bona fide sales of "interest" in property estate for "adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth"). Therefore, the court concluded that
it would compare the value of the remainder that the decedent transferred to the
value of the consideration received, measured as of the date of transfer. See
D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313.
145. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313 (finding that Gregory court erred and that
inadequacy of consideration made case inapplicable to present issue). In Gregory,
the decedent exchanged property worth $66,000 for a life estate worth $12,000.
Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1017. The Third Circuit reasoned that because of this gross
inadequacy, the Gregory holding does not extend to the issue in D'Ambrosio of
"whether, when a remainder is sold for its stipulated fair market value, the consid-
eration received is inadequate because it is less than the fee simple value of the
property." D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 313. For a further discussion of the facts, hold-
ing and reasoning of Gregory, see supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
146. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314 (finding that Past court's valuations were
analytically incorrect). In Past, the decedent, in a "widow's election" will, sold her
half of community property in exchange for a life estate in the whole. United
States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 13-14 (9th Cir. 1965). The D'Ambrosio court reasoned
that because the decedent already owned the life estate in her half of the property,
she essentially exchanged the remainder interest in her half of the property for a
life estate in her husband's half. DAmbrosio, 101 F.3d at 314. The Past court, how-
ever, compared the entire portion of the decedent's property with the life estate
that she received and as a result, it held that the consideration was inadequate.
Past, 347 F.2d at 14. The D'Ambrosio court reasoned that this analysis was incorrect
because the decedent never relinquished her half of the community property.
D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314. Rather, she contributed only her remainder interest
in that half. See id.
35
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life estate. 14 7 The Third Circuit concluded that the Past court misunder-
stood the nature of property interests and compared "apples and
oranges."
148
Finally, for three reasons, the Third Circuit rejected the Gradow
court's reasoning that Allen, Gregory and Past were consistent with the
"most natural reading" and purposes of § 2036(a).149 First, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that Allen, Gregory and Past were either inapposite or based on
faulty analysis.' 50 Next, the court held that the most natural reading of
§ 2036(a) is consistent with the estate's argument and not the Gradow
court's argument that the bona fide sale exception includes remainder
interests sold for their fair market value:' 51 Finally, the Third Circuit rea-
soned that the application of Gradow to a remainder-interest transfer for
adequate and full consideration would subject the transferor to double
taxation. 1
52
147. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314 (discussing what Past court could have
done in analyzing value). The court noted that alternatively, the Past court could
have used the fee simple value of the wife's share, but it would then have to mea-
sure that against the value of the life estate in both halves of the property. See id.
(noting that if Past court had used proper method, it would have found decedent
received consideration in excess of property value that she had transferred).
148. Id. (stating that Past court reached wrong result because it "compared
'apples and oranges"'). For a further discussion of the facts, holding and reason-
ing of Past, see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
149. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314 (discussing why Gradow court considered
Gregory, Past and Allen persuasive) (citing Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808,
813 (1987), affid, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
150. See id. at 312-14 (analyzing Allen, Gregory and Past). For a discussion on
why the Third Circuit found these cases unpersuasive, see supra notes 138-48 and
accompanying text.
151. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314-15 ("[W]e think the statutory text better
supports appellant's argument."). The IRS used the Gradow court's statutory analy-
sis as its support for the proper reading of § 2036(a). Id. For a further discussion
of the Third's Circuit's critical analysis of the Gradow court's interpretation of
§ 2036(a) and the IRS's reliance thereon, see supra notes 131-37 and accompany-
ing text.
152. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316 (evaluating aspect of hypothetical that
would cause double taxation). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's view that the
application of Gradow would result in double taxation, see infra notes 180-83 and
accompanying text.
The Gradow court also expressed a concern that, if the bona fide sale excep-
tion of § 2036(a) includes remainder-interest transfers at their actuarial value, "[a]
young person could sell a remainder interest for a fraction of the property's worth,
enjoy the property for life, and then pass it along without estate or gift tax conse-
quences." Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 815. The Third Circuit considered this Gradow
reasoning problematic because it ignored the time value of money. D'Ambrosio,
F.3d at 316. The court hypothesized:
Assume that a decedent sells his son a remainder interest in ... Black-
acre, which is worth $1 million in fee simple, for its actuarial fair market
value of $100,000 (an amount which implicitly includes the market value
of Blackacre's expected appreciation). Decedent then invests the pro-
ceeds of the sale. If the rates of return for both assets are equal and
decedent lives exactly as long as the actuarial tables predict, the consider-
ation that decedent received for his remainder will equal the value of
1984
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Prior to the Third Circuit's ruling in D'Ambrosio, the IRS had success-
fully employed the Gradow reasoning as its primary support against the
sale-of-remainder-interest technique.15 3 For example, in Pittman v. United
States, the Eastern District of North Carolina cited Gradow and held that
§ 2036(a) measures the value of the entire property against the consideration
received. 154 Although the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia had reservations about Gradow in Parker v. United
States,'5 5 the court concluded that the estate did not meet its burden of
proving that the IRS's use of Gradow was wrong.
15 6
The Gradow decision and its progeny have inspired critical legal com-
mentary. 157 A primary assertion is that the inclusion of the full value of
the property in the estate when the remainder interest was sold for its fair
market value will result in double taxation. 158 One commentator stresses
that the Gradow court's definition of adequate consideration for estate tax
purposes is inconsistent with the definition of adequate consideration for
gift tax purposes.' 59 Therefore, all remainder-interest transfers result in
Blackacre on the date of his death. The equivalent value will, accord-
ingly, still be included in the gross estate. Moreover, decedent's son will
have only a $100,000 basis in Blackacre, because that is all he paid for it.
He will then be subject to capital gains taxes on its appreciated value if he
decides to ever sell the property. Had Blackacre been passed by dece-
dent's will and included in the gross estate, the son would have received a
stepped-up basis at the time of his father's death or the alternate valua-
tion date.
Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit had great difficulty understanding how a remain-
der interest sold for its actuarial value would be abusive. See id. at 316-17. For a
discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of Gradow, see supra notes 93-108
and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 445, 447 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(citing Gradow and concluding that value of what decedent received must be com-
pared to entire value of underlying property); Pittman v. United States, 878 F.
Supp. 833, 835 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (same); Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 71
T.C.M. (CCH) 1856, 1862 (1996) (stating that, to determine whether considera-
tion is adequate, court must compare value decedent received with total value of
property decedent transferred, rather than just remainder-interest value).
154. Pittman, 878 F. Supp. at 835. For a further discussion of Pittman, see
supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
155. 894 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
156. Id. at 447. For a further discussion of Parker, see supra note 115.
157. For a listing of legal commentators criticizing Gradow and the court deci-
sions supporting Gradow, see supra note 119.
158. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 689-92 (illustrating how requirement that re-
mainder interests be sold for fair market value of underlying property creates
double taxation); Lorey, supra note 13, at 196 (arguing that result of Gradow is to
cause double taxation "without doing anything to further the goal of preventing
estate depletion").
159. SeeJordan, supra note 5, at 678-83 (stating that, following Gradow, ade-
quate and full consideration has two distinct definitions for gift and estate tax pur-
poses). For gift tax purposes, adequate consideration is defined as consideration
equal to the actuarial value of the remainder interest. See id. at 678 (citing I.R.C.
§ 2512(a) (1994)). This commentator argues that these definitions should be rec-
onciled to promote the neutrality of the tax policy. See id. at 683-85 ("Interpreting
1997] 1985
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either a gift tax or estate tax, regardless of whether the sale was for ade-
quate consideration. 1
60
The Third Circuit became the first court to be persuaded by the legal
commentary and to reject Gradow.161 The court declined to follow the
subsequent case law supporting Gradow and stated that none of these opin-
ions provide a "cogent" analysis of § 2036(a). 162 In addition, the Third
Circuit found the negative legal commentary to be "well-taken." 163
In contrast to the legal commentary, the D'Ambrosio dissent asserted
that the Third Circuit thwarted § 2036(a)'s intended purpose to prevent
adequate consideration identically for purposes of the two transfer taxes adheres
to the principle of neutrality, which is an important concern in the formulation of
transfer tax policy." (citing Gans, supra note 7, at 765)).
Adequate consideration should be consideration sufficient to prevent deple-
tion of the estate. See id. at 689 (stating that "defining adequate and full considera-
tion as consideration sufficient to prevent depletion of the gross estate" coincides
with Supreme Court teachings on purposes of two taxes). For a remainder inter-
est, the commentator asserted that adequate consideration is its actuarial value.
See id. at 693-95 (discussing adequate consideration as determined based on as-
sumption of taxpayer's retention and investment of proceeds from sale of remain-
der interest).
160. See id. at 681-82 (stating that if both definitions of adequate considera-
tion apply, then one party will inevitably incur transfer tax). The commentator
notes that under the Gradow rationale, "if the remainder interest is sold for its
actuarial value, the taxpayer pays estate tax on the date of death value of the...
[property] less the consideration received for the remainder interest." Id. at 682
(citing I.R.C. § 2043(a) (1994)). If a taxpayer follows Gradow and sells the remain-
der interest for the fee simple value of the property, the taxpayer avoids both the
gift tax and the estate tax. See id. (stating that this avoidance occurs whether gift
tax value of remainder interest is its actuarial value or value of underlying property
because taxpayer receives adequate consideration).
This sale, however, creates problems for the purchaser. See id. (noting tax
problems that arise). Viewed from the purchaser's perspective, the remainder in-
terest's worth is equal to its actuarial value. See id. at 682 & n.50 (discussing fact
that this disparity from purchaser's perspective occurs even if special valuation
rules require remainder interest to be valued at fair market value of underlying
property to determine tax consequences for transferor). Thus, the commentator
concluded that:
[T]he purchaser pays more for the remainder interest than it is worth.
Consequently, the sale.., results in a gift from the purchaser to the seller
and the imposition of the gift tax on the purchaser. The amount of the
gift equals the excess of the fair market value of the underlying property
over actuarial value of the remainder interest.
Id. at 682 (citing I.R.C. § 2512(b)).
161. See Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 314-17 (3d Cir.
1996) (rejecting Gradow and citing with approval legal commentary that is critical
of Gradow), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
162. See id. at 317 (concluding that courts following Gradow are unpersuasive).
The Third Circuit said that the decisions supporting Gradow do not persuade it
that the Gradow reasoning is sound because of their lack of analysis. See id. For a
discussion of the judicial decisions following the Gradow interpretation of
§ 2036(a), see supra notes 110-18, 153-56 and accompanying text.
163. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 317 (citing and agreeing with critical com-
mentary on Gradow). For a discussion of the legal commentary criticizing the
Gradow reasoning, see supra notes 119-21, 157-60 and accompanying text.
1986
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decedents from avoiding estate taxes by selling their property to a third
party, while retaining the benefits of ownership during their lives. 1 64 The
dissent cited Commissioner v. Estate of Church,16 5 in which the Supreme
Court held that an estate can only avoid estate tax if the decedent made a
bona fide transfer and "absolutely, irrevocably, and without possible reser-
vations, parts with all of his title... possession... and enjoyment of the
transferred property."166 The dissent concluded that the decedent failed
the Church requirement because all title, enjoyment and possession of the
stock were not unequivocally halted.1 67 A literal reading of the dissent's
assertion raises the question of whether it is ever possible to sell a remain-
der interest, while retaining a life estate, and still meet the bona fide sale
exception. 168 The dissent, however, only used Church as support for its
position that adequate and fair consideration must be measured against
the property that would otherwise be included in the decedent's gross es-
tate without the remainder-interest transfer.' 6 9 The dissent, however, did
164. SeeDAmbrosio, 101 F.3d at 318 (CowenJ, dissenting). The dissent stated
that "[w] hen a taxpayer makes a transfer with a retained life interest, the powerful
arm of section 2036(a) pulls into the gross estate the full value of the transferred
property, not merely the value of the remainder interest." See id. (Cowen, J., dis-
senting). Judge Cowen noted that the majority accepted the view that the dece-
dent "sold" only her remainder interest in the stock to Vaparo. See id. (Cowen, J.,
dissenting). "This view of section 2036 sanctions tax evasion: It enables strategic
segmentation of the property into multiple interests, with 'adequate and full con-
sideration' now required only for a specific transferred segment .... Id. (Cowen,
J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that such an interpretation thwarts
§ 2036(a)'s paramount purpose to prevent the depletion of estate assets when indi-
viduals retain the use and enjoyment of those assets until death. See id. (Cowen,J.,
dissenting).
165. 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
166. D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 319 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (citing Church, 335
U.S. at 645). For additional discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Church, see supra note 43.
167. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 319 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (concluding that
decedent failed to meet "requirement that all title, enjoyment and possession of
the transferred property be unequivocally halted"). The dissent then referred to a
1940 case commenting on a predecessor to § 2036(a), in which the Supreme
Court stated that the law "taxes not merely those interests which are deemed to
pass at death according to refined technicalities of the law of property," but also
"taxes inter vivos transfers that are too much akin to testamentary dispositions not
to be subjected to the same excise." Id. (Cowen, J., dissenting) (citing Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112 (1940)). ThereforeJudge Cowen concluded that the
bona fide sale analysis cannot focus merely on the limited property interest that is
sold. See id. (Cowen; J., dissenting). Instead, it must also consider the property
that would otherwise be included in the decedent's gross estate. See id. (Cowen,J.,
dissenting).
168. See id. at 318-20 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (discussing requisites of bona
fide sale analysis). But cf. id. at 313 (noting that Congress never said in § 2036(a)
that remainder-interest transfers are illegal).
169. See id. at 319 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (implying that Church demonstrates
that courts must construe § 2036(a) to prevent testamentary-type transfers from
evading estate tax). The D'Ambrosio dissent also cites Gradow as well-reasoned case
law that correctly tests the adequacy of the consideration that a taxpayer received
39
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say that § 2036(a) does not exempt property transfers in which the trans-
feror retains an income interest in his or her underlying assets. °70 Thus,
under this reasoning, the decedent's remainder-interest transfer in
D'Ambrosio would fail the bona fide sale exception simply because she re-
ceived an annuity that retained her income interest in the stock. 171
The Third Circuit's holding in D'Ambrosio recognizes the economic
reality of a remainder interest transfer for fair market value.' 72 The court
did not agree with the Commissioner's abusiveness concerns with such a
transaction.1 73 The court consequently held that a remainder-interest
against the amount that the taxpayer's gross estate would otherwise include. Id. at
318, 320 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 320 (Cowen, J., dissenting) ("[C]ourts have consistently held
that section 2036(a) does not exempt transfers of property in which the taxpayer
retains an income interest .. "). The dissent concluded that, as the Tenth Circuit
held in Allen:
"It does not seem plausible ... that Congress intended to allow such an
easy avoidance of the taxable incidence befalling reserved life estates.
This result would allow a taxpayer to reap the benefits of property for his
lifetime and, in contemplation of death, sell only the interest entitling
him to the income, thereby removing all of the property which he has
enjoyed from his gross estate. . . . [I]n a situation like this, Congress
meant the estate to include the corpus of the trust or in its stead, an
amount equal in value."
Id. (Cowen,J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 918 (10th
Cir. 1961)).
171. Id. at 320 (Cowen, J., dissenting) ("Even if the annuity ... were not an
attempt to deplete her property ... section 2036(a) does not exempt transfers of
property in which the taxpayer retains an income interest .... "). Under the dis-
sent's interpretation, the estate value would include the value of the stock less the
consideration that the decedent received. See I.R.C. § 2043 (1994) (reducing
amount includible in gross estate by amount of consideration received).
172. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316 (illustrating how remainder interest trans-
ferred for its actuarial value will not deplete decedent's estate); see also Abendroth,
supra note 6, at 52 (asserting remainder interest sold for its value under the IRS
tables is sufficient to prevent depletion of transferor's gross estate); Jordan, supra
note 5, at 692-93 (arguing consideration equal to actuarial value of remainder in-
terest prevents depletion of estate). But see D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 320 (Cowen, J.,
dissenting) (citing Gradow to criticize "economic reality" argument).
173. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316. The Third Circuit stated that even look-
ing at the estate's argument in policy terms, it is "difficult to fathom either the Tax
Court's or the Commissioner's concerns about the 'abusiveness' of this transac-
tion." Id. The court then used a hypothetical to illustrate its point:
Returning to the widow's election cases, assume that the surviving
spouse's share of the community property is valued at $2,000,000. Assum-
ing that she decides not to accept the settlement and to keep that prop-
erty, its whole value will be available for inclusion in the gross estate at
death, but only as long as the widow lives entirely on the income from the
property. If she invades principal and sells some of the property in order
to meet living expenses or purchase luxury items, then at least some of
that value will not be included in the gross estate. ...
Next, assume that same widow decides to sell her remainder and
keep a life estate. As long as she sells the remainder for its fair market
value, it makes no difference whether she receives cash, other property,
or an annuity. All can be discounted to their respective present values
1988 [Vol. 42: p. 1949
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transfer for its fair market value prevents the depletion of the estate and
does not evade taxation. 174 Therefore, the policy behind § 2036(a) and
the integrity of the estate tax system are not undermined by the remain-
der-interest transfer. 175 The IRS may argue that the consideration re-
ceived for the remainder interest may disappear before the transferor's
death, but even the spending of the sale proceeds, however, does not de-
plete the estate. 176 The IRS may also assert that the consideration will not
be sufficient if the transferor dies shortly after the sale.1 77 Although this
conclusion is correct, it ignores situations in which the taxpayer lives well
beyond his or her life expectancy. 178 Thus, as long as the IRS tables are
accurate, the fair market value consideration received for the remainder
interest will be adequate, on average. 17
9
and quantified. If she continues to support herself from the income
from her life estate, the consideration she received for the remainder, if
properly invested, will still be available for inclusion in the gross estate....
On the other hand, if her life estate is insufficient to meet her living
expenses, the widow will have to invade the consideration she received in
exchange for her remainder, but to no different an extent than she
would under the previous hypothetical in which she retained the fee sim-
ple interest. In sum, there is simply no change in the date-of-death value
of the final estate, regardless of which option she selects, at any given
standard of living.
Id. (emphasis added). But see id. at 320 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing that this
view ignores Congress's judgment that transfers with retained life estates are gener-
ally testamentary transactions). The dissent states that "'the fond hope that a sur-
viving spouse would take pains to invest, compound, and preserve inviolate all life
income from half of a trust, knowing that it would thereupon be taxed without his
having received any lifetime benefit, is a slim basis for putting a different construc-
tion on Section 2036(a) . . . .'" Id. (Cowen, J., dissenting) (quoting Gradow v.
United States, 11. Cl. Ct. 808, 815-16 (1987), affd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
174. See id. at 316 (illustrating why remainder interest transfer for its fair mar-
ket value does not deplete estate); see also Abendroth, supra note 6, at 52 (showing
how D'Ambrosio transaction does not deplete decedent's estate); Jordan, supra note
5, at 693-94 (using annuity hypothetical to illustrate same).
175. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 52-53 (noting DAmbrosio transaction did
not undermine policy of § 2036(a) to prevent depletion of gross estate).
176. See id. at 52 (asserting that "this [IRS argument] is an attack on the suffi-
ciency of form of the consideration, not an attack on the method for calculating
what constitutes adequate consideration"); see alsoJordan, supra note 5, at 695 (dis-
cussing how proceeds from remainder-interest sale creates substitute for value of
underlying property, regardless of whether proceeds are retained or consumed).
177. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 317 (discussing IRS assertion that decedent's
estate plan is "'calculated to deplete decedent estate in the event she should not
survive as long as her actuarially projected life expectancy"' and noting decedent
equally likely to outlive life expectancy (quoting Commissioner's Brief at 34-35,
Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-
7643))); see also Abendroth, supra note 6, at 52-53 (discussing potential IRS
arguments).
178. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 317 (stating that it is equally possible that any
decedent will outlive actuarial expectancy, causing gross estate to be larger and IRS
to benefit); Abendroth, supra note 6, at 52 (same).
179. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 52 (concluding that, on average, consid-
eration for remainder interest will be adequate).
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The Third Circuit's D Ambrosio decision also avoids the double taxa-
tion effect of Gradow.'80 The Gradow court held that consideration suffi-
cient to prevent depletion of the gross estate is consideration equal to the
fair market value of the underlying property.1 81 If the decedent sells a
remainder interest for its fair market value and not for the fair market
value of the underlying property, Gradow requires that § 2036(a) bring the
entire property back into the estate, subject only to an offset for the con-
sideration received. 18 2 Thus, the postsale appreciation of the transferred
asset will be taxed at death and the estate will be double taxed because the
consideration that the decedent received will also have appreciated and
will be subject to tax on its increased value.1 8 3
Although D'Ambrosio alters the application of § 2036(a) remainder-in-
terest transfers at their fair market value, it does not change the require-
ment that the remainder-interest transfer must be a "bona fide" sale.
1 84
For the purposes of § 2036(a), a "bona fide" sale for adequate considera-
tion is an arm's length sale or exchange that is free from testamentary
intent.' 85
In D'Ambrosio, the Tax Court asserted that the decedent's transfer was
of a testamentary nature because she made the transfer when she was
eighty years old to a family-owned corporation in return for an annuity
180. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316 (illustrating how estate would be double
taxed under Gradow's holding); see alsoJordan, supra note 5, at 689-91 (concluding
that application of Gradow would result in double taxation); Lorey, supra note 13,
at 196 (same).
181. Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 812-15 (1987), affd, 897 F.2d
516 (Fed. Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the facts, holding and reasoning of the
Gradow court, see supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
182. Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 813-14 (concluding that reading of § 2036(a) re-
quires gross estate to be valued with all property that decedent has ever transferred
except when transfer was by bona fide sale and that "time-of-transfer consideration
received is then offset against" value of transferred property).
183. See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316 (discussing double-tax effect of Gradow).
The Third Circuit observed that "if the full, fee simple value of the property at the
time of death is pulled back into the gross estate under 2036(a), subject only to an
offset for the consideration received, then the post sale appreciation of the trans-
ferred asset will be taxed at death." Id. Therefore, the court concluded that the
postsale appreciation "will be double taxed; because, all things being equal, the
consideration [that the decedent received] will also have appreciated and will be
subject to tax on its increased value." Id.; see alsoJordan, supra note 5, at 690-91
(illustrating through hypothetical that if.Gradow's definition of adequate consider-
ation is adopted, sale of remainder interest augments gross estate, resulting in
double taxation); Remainder Sold for FMV Not Included in Seller's Estate, EsT. PLAN-
NER'S ALERT, Jan. 1997, at 3 (providing hypothetical to illustrate double tax effect
of Gradow interpretation).
184. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1994) (stating that general rule of transfer with re-
tained life estate is to include full value of underlying asset in decedent's estate
except when transfer was bona fide sale made for full and adequate consideration);
see a/soJordan, supra note 5, at 717 (discussing requirement that to meet § 2036 (a)
exception, remainder interest transfer must be "bona fide" sale).
185. SeeJordan, supranote 5, at 718 (noting that in such exchange, both par-
ties seek to receive equal value to that which they surrender).
1990
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worth more than $1 million less than the underlying stock.1 86 The Com-
missioner argued that the estate plan was "'calculated to deplete the dece-
dent's estate in the event that she should not survive as long as her
actuarially projected life expectancy.""81 7
The Third Circuit, however, noted that there was no evidence that the
decedent transferred the remainder interest in the stock in contemplation
of death or with a testamentary motivation.' 8 8 Moreover, the decedent
was just as likely to outlive her actuarially projected life expectancy,
thereby collecting more from her annuity and enlarging the estate to an
amount greater than it would be worth absent the remainder-interest
transfer.'8 9 Thus, under the Third Circuit's analysis, the transaction in
D'Ambrosio met the bona fide sale requirement of § 2036(a). 190
With D'Ambrosio, there is a split between the Third Circuit and the
Federal Circuit regarding the proper interpretation of § 2036(a). The
Third Circuit has a stronger argument because the sale-of-remainder-inter-
est technique does not undermine § 2036(a)'s policy of avoiding deple-
tion of the estate. 19' Since DAmbrosio, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has agreed with the Third Circuit's argument in
Wheeler v. United States.19 2
186. Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 252, 260 (1995) (dis-
cussing testamentary nature of transaction), rev'd, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), and
cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997). For a further discussion of the Tax Court's
decision in D'Ambrosio, see supra notes 116-18, 123 and accompanying text.
187. D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 317 (quoting Commissioner's Brief at 34-35, Es-
tate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7643)).
188. See id. at 311.
189. See id. at 317 (discussing idea that transferor of remainder interest could
outlive actuarial tables and gross estate could become larger).
190. Id. at 311, 317 (holding that there is no evidence that decedent made
remainder-interest transfer with donative intent).
191. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's rationale that a remainder interest
sold for its actuarial value does not deplete the estate, see supra notes 172-83 and
accompanying text.
192. 116 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 1997). In Wheeler, Elmore K. Melton,Jr. sold the
remainder interest in a 376-acre ranch to his two adopted sons, John and David
Wheeler, in 1984. Id. at 751. The parties determined the remainder interest's
purchase price of $337,790 by "multiplying the sum of the appraised fair market
value of the ranch's fee simple interest, $1,314,200, plus $10,000, by .025509, the
factor set forth in the appropriate actuarial table in the Treasury Regulations." Id.
at 752 (citing Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(a) (as amended in 1990)). Melton died in
1991 and John Wheeler filed an estate tax return reporting a gross estate of
$581,106, and paid the estate tax liability of $199,936. See id. The gross estate did
not include any amount for the ranch, because Melton's life estate in the ranch
terminated at his death. See id. at 752-53. The IRS subsequently charged that the
"Melton estate should have included in the gross estate the difference between the
date-of-death value of the ranch.., and the consideration paid by the sons for the
remainder interest," which was $736,200. Id. at 753. The estate paid the tax defi-'
ciency of $320,831 and then filed a claim for refund. See id. (noting that IRS relied
on § 2036(a) to bring ranch back into Melton's estate).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that the
issue of Wheeler was "whether the phrase 'adequate and full consideration' . .. of
1997] CASEBRIEF 1991
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IV. EFFECT OF THIRD CIRCUIT RULING
D'Ambrosio resolves the uncertainty in the Third Circuit about how
remainder-interest transfers would be treated for estate tax purposes. 19 3
Before D'Ambrosio, the fear was that as the life tenants in the 1980s transac-
tions passed away, the Gradow interpretation of § 2036(a) would unravel
these transactions and include the full fee simple value in the life tenant's
estate.194 Now, in the Third Circuit, as long as the remainder interest was
sold in an arm's length transaction for an amount equal to or greater than
the remainder-interest value determined under the IRS valuation tables,
the entire property is exempt from the calculation of the decedent's es-
section 2036(a) is to be applied in reference to the value of the remainder interest
transferred... or in reference to the value of the full fee simple interest which the
transferor had immediately before the transfer." Id. at 754 (quoting I.R.C.
§ 2036(a) (1994)). To determine the proper construction of "adequate and full
consideration," the court analyzed the reasoning in Gradow, Allen, Gregory, Past,
Pittman and D'Ambrosio. See id. at 755-63 (citing D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 309;
Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990); United States v. Past, 347
F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961); Pitt-
man v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Estate of Gregory v. Com-
missioner, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963)). Following this analysis, the Wheeler court
concluded that "[t]he sale of a remainder interest for its actuarial value does not
deplete the seller's estate." Id. at 762. The court explained that:
"The actuarial value of the remainder interest equals the amount that will
grow to a principal sum equal to the value of the property that passes to
the remainderman at termination of the retained interest. To reach this
conclusion, the tables assume that both the consideration received for
the remainder interest and the underlying property are invested at the
table rate of interest, compounded annually." In other words, the actua-
rial tables are premised on the recognition that, at the end of the actua-
rial period, there is no discernible difference between (1) an estate
holder retaining the full fee interest in the estate and (2) an estate holder
retaining income from the life estate and selling the remainder interest
for its actuarial value-in either case, the estate is not depleted.
Id. (quotingJordan, supra note 5, at 692-93). Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that "the
sale of a remainder interest for its actuarial value as calculated by the appropriate
factor set forth in the Treasury Regulations constitutes an adequate and full con-
sideration under section 2036(a)." Id. at 767.
193. See Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that D'Ambrosio plaintiff's attor-
ney opined that Third Circuit decision benefits estates of decedents who made
remainder-interest transfers before 1987 Code revision); see also I.R.C. § 2036(c)
(1988), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, tit. XI, § 11601(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1490 (eliminating sale of remainder inter-
est technique for transfers to family members after December 1987). Section
2036(c) was repealed in 1990 and replaced by § 2702, which applies to transfers
after October 8, 1990. See I.R.C. § 2702 (1994).
For a discussion of § 2702, see supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the D'Ambrosio decision's effect on Third Circuit transactions within
the scope of § 2702, see infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
194. See Abendroth, supra note 6, at 49-54 (discussing, prior to Third Circuit
ruling in D'Ambrosio, that IRS using Gradow as "battering ram" to attack sale-of-
remainder-interest technique and advising practitioners to unwind previous trans-
actions if Third Circuit upholds Gradow interpretation). For a discussion of the
Gradow court's interpretation of § 2036 (a), see supra notes 93-108 and accompany-
ing text.
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tate. 19 5 For example, the decedent in D'Ambrosio exchanged her remain-
der interest in stock for a private annuity that, at the time of the sale, had a
value equivalent to the remainder interest.196 Thus, the Third Circuit de-
cision allows a decedent to realize his or her intent by using the sale-of-
remainder-interest technique.
The Third Circuit ruling has no effect on remainder interests trans-
ferred to family members after the Code revision. 19 7 Under § 2702, the
sale of a remainder interest to a family member is treated as a gift, even if
the family member paid the fair market value for the remainder inter-
est.198 Thus, unless the transaction falls within two narrow exceptions - a
sale to a qualified trust or a sale of a personal residence - § 2702 requires
the taxpayer to treat the transfer as equivalent to a transfer of the entire
property.199
DAmbrosio, however, does apply to current transfers outside the scope
of § 2702.200 As long as the seller transfers the remainder interest to a
buyer that the Code does not, consider a family member, a remainder-
interest transfer for its fair market value avoids both gift and estate tax in
the Third Circuit. 20 1 For example, § 2702's rules do not apply to remain-
der-interest transfers to nieces and nephews.
20 2
195. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding and reasoning in
D'Ambrosio, see supra notes 122-92 and accompanying text.
196. D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 311 (discussing facts of transaction). For further
discussion of the DAmbrosio transaction, see supra note 117.
197. See I.R.C. § 2702 (a) (1) (treating sale of remainder -interest to family
member as gift); see also Remainder Sold for FMV Not Included in Seller's Estate, supra
note 183, at 2-3 (implying Third Circuit effect limited by § 2702).
198. See I.R.C. § 2702(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-4(d), ex. 2 (as
amended in 1992) ("The amount of the gift is the full value of the property less the
consideration received from the purchaser."). For a further discussion of the
scope of § 2702, see'supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
199. See I.R.C. § 2702 (a) (2) (B), (a) (3) (A) (ii); see alsoJordan, supra note 5, at
706-16 (discussing § 2702's narrow exceptions and consequences of not meeting
these exceptions). For a further discussion of the § 2702's two exceptions, see
supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
200. See Remainder SoldforFMVNot Included in Seller's Estate, supra note 183, at 2
(noting that § 2702 rules do not apply to transfers to nonfamily members). For a
further discussion of who is a family member, see supra notes 21, 79 and infra notes
201-02.
201. See I.R.C. §§ 2702(e), 2704(c)(2) (1994) (defining family member for
purposes of § 2702); see alsoJordan, supra note 5, at 681-95 (discussing how inter-
pretation of § 2036(a) as Third Circuit did would allow remainder interest transfer
for its actuarial value to avoid estate and gift taxes).
202. I.R.C. §§ 2702(e), 2704(c)(2). Section 2704(c)(2) states that "[t]he
term 'member of the family' means, with respect to any individual-(A) such indi-
vidual's spouse, (B) any ancestor or lineal descendant of such individual or such
individual's spouse, (C) any brother or sister of the individual, and (D) any spouse
of any individual described in subparagraph (B) or (C)." Id. § 2704(c) (2). For an
additional discussion of § 2702's application to remainder-interest transfers, see
supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
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Thus, in the Third Circuit, the sale-of-a-remainder-interest technique
is still a viable option for transactions to individuals other than § 2702 fam-
ily members. 20 3 As long as the transferor makes a bona fide sale for ade-
quate and fair consideration to a nonfamily member, the fee simple value
of the property will not be brought back into the estate and the transfer
will not be subject to gift tax.20 4 Moreover, the Third Circuit revalidated
the sale-of-remainder-interest technique for transfers to family members
completed prior to December 1987.205
Scott B. Connolly
203. For a further discussion of how family member and nonfamily member
transactions are affected differently by the Code and the Third Circuit's decision
in D'Ambrosio, see supra notes 21, 200-02 and accompanying text.
204. See Estate of D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 312-18 (3d Cir.
1996) (upholding remainder-interest technique), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822
(1997). For a detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's decision, see supra notes
122-92 and accompanying text.
205. See DAmbrosio, 101 F.3d at 312-18 (holding that 1987 remainder-interest
transfer met bona fide sale exception of § 2036 (a)); see also Gottlieb, supra note 14,
at 2 (noting that Third Circuit decision benefits transactions effected prior to De-
cember 1987 Code revision). See generally Remainder Sold for FMV Not Included in
Seller's Estate, supra note 183, at 3 (discussing benefit of D'Ambrosio holding outside
of Third Circuit).
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